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I. INTRODUCTION
After thirty-one years of service, United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice Byron White retired from the bench.' This Article focuses on the
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., The
American University, Washington College of Law. The author is indebted to Mr. Daniel R.
Groth, Jr., a third year law student at The John Marshall Law School, for his invaluable and
dedicated assistance.
1. Justice White was appointed to the Court by President Kennedy in 1962. Dennis J.
Hutchinson, Byron White Justice from Colorado, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, ILLUSTRATED
BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1993, at 461, 464 (Clare Cushman ed. 1993); THE BURGER COURT-THE
COUNTER-REvoLUTION THAT WASN'T 254-55 (Vincent Blasi ed. 1983). On March 19, 1993, he
announced his retirement. See Supreme Court Justice White to Step Down, Conservative Justice,
a Foe of Abortion, to Retire at End of Term, Giving Clinton Opportunity to Make Court
Appointment, CHI. TRiB., March 19, 1993, at 1; Joan Biskupic, Clinton's Chance for Change;
Choice Could Ease Conservative Grip on Court, WASH. POST, March 20, 1993, at Al; In Years on
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evolution of Justice White's position on the constitutional rights of crim-
inal suspects during police interrogations.2 Shortly after his appoint-
ment, Justice White penned three biting dissents in cases limiting the
admissibility of incriminating statements made by suspects while being
interrogated by the police or their surrogates.' These dissents rebuked
the Court for unnecessarily expanding the Constitution.4 Further, these
dissents clearly identified Justice White as a staunch defender of law
enforcement.
In the first of these cases, Massiah v. United States,' Justice White
admonished the Court for attempting to "sweep these disagreeable mat-
ters under the rug ' 6 and bar "relevant, reliable and highly probative"
evidence.7 He also reprimanded the Court for basing its decision to bar
the admissibility of all incriminating statements made after indictment
on the feeblest of foundations.8 Similarly, in Escobedo v. Illinois,9 Jus-
tice White castigated the Court for extending Massiah's Sixth Amend-
ment "post-indictment" rule to bar all incriminating statements made
before indictment at the "critical stage"' 0 of a criminal investigation."
Justice White's strongest condemnation of the Court, however, was
expressed in his dissent in Miranda v. Arizona.'2 Justice White attacked
the Court's Fifth Amendment-based decision, which required the police
to inform a suspect of his right to remain silent and right to an attorney,
as unsupported by history or the language of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self incrimination.1 3
Despite the strong language of the Miranda dissent, it is evident
Court, White Gradually Swung to Right, USA WEEKEND, March 20, 1993, at 2A. On June 28,
1993, with much-deserved recognition for his judicial achievements, Justice White ended his
service as a United States Supreme Court Justice. Justice White's Last Day, WASH. POST, June
29, 1993, at A6.
2. The use of the term "police interrogation" throughout this Article includes the
interrogation of criminal suspects by all law enforcement agencies, federal, state, and local.
3. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (White, J., dissenting); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
4. See, e~g., Massiah, 377 U.S. at 209 (White, J., dissenting); Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 497
(White, J., dissenting); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 527 (White, J., dissenting).
5. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). For a full discussion of Massiah, see infra notes 145-164 and
accompanying text.
6. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 (White, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 208.
8. Id.
9. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a full discussion of Escobedo, see infra notes 165-180 and
accompanying text.
10. This term was used by Justice Goldberg in the Court's opinion. Id. at 486.
11. Id. at 495-99 (White, J., dissenting).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a full discussion of Miranda, see infra notes 20-39 and
accompanying text.
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 526-45 (White, J., dissenting).
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that Justice White later abandoned his former steadfast opposition to
Miranda, although his antipathy to the rules established in Escobedo,
Massiah, and their progeny remained. This Article examines the incom-
plete metamorphosis of Justice White's position on the rights of criminal
suspects during police interrogation and posits that he eventually
embraced the Miranda decision at the expense of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Part II analyzes Justice White's position in decisions
concerning the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
from his early antagonism to Miranda to recent decisions where he
authored opinions, or joined majority decisions, expanding the Miranda
doctrine or maintaining the status quo. Part III examines Justice White's
stance on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the area of police
interrogation. Part IV assesses and compares the divergent lines of juris-
prudence created by Justice White and suggests that his change of heart
on Miranda was designed to curtail the expansion of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. In addition, Part IV examines the invalidity of
Justice White's position on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
light of his other transformation.
II. JUSTICE WHITE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court's 1966 Miranda decision provoked great con-
troversy, which persists to this day. 4 Despite the vociferous outcry
from "supporters of law enforcement" and Miranda detractors, the doc-
trine survives. Given the composition of the former Burger Court and
14. See, e.g., RICHARD Y. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTER REVOLUTION? THE WARREN
COURT AND THE BURGER COURT: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN MODERN AMERICA 133-210
(1977); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 153-93 (1970); Yale Kamisar, A Dissent
from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Test, reprinted in YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (Yale Kamisar ed. 1980) [hereinafter KAMISAR, ESSAYS]; Gerald M.
Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the
Warren Court and its Conservative Critics: Toward A Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 591 (1990); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional
Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988); Joseph D. Grano,
Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979); Fred E. Inbau,
Over-Reaction-The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982);
Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to
"Reconsidering Miranda", 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938 (1987); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 1, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, (February 12, 1986), reprinted in 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good For The Soul?: A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda
v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1986); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987); David Sonenshein,
Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13.LoY. U. CI. L.J. 405 (1982).
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present Rehnquist Court, it is, to no small measure, the advocacy of
Justice White that has sustained Miranda beyond expectations.1 5 Sec-
tion A traces Justice White's early opposition to the decision. Section B
explores the later opinions written or endorsed by Justice White in sup-
port of Miranda.
A. Justice White's Miranda Dissent and Other Opinions Opposing
the Miranda Decision
Justice White signaled his opposition to the Warren Court's Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence in the 1964 case of Malloy v. Hogan.16 In
Hogan, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the privilege against self-incrimination con-
tained in the Fifth Amendment making it applicable to the states.' 7 Jus-
tice White dissented, pointing to an unwarranted departure from
established rules governing the privilege against self-incrimination.
18
He noted that the Court was allowing the witness to invoke the privilege
on his own estimation of the tendency to incriminate, rather than the
15. Miranda was a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Warren, and supported by Justices
Black, Douglas, Brennan and Fortas. Justices Harlan, Stewart, Clark and White dissented. At the
time of his retirement in 1993, Justice White was the sole Justice on the Court who participated in
the Miranda decision.
The softening of the Court on the issue of confessions law has been discussed by several
commentators. They concluded that the conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts have sought to
weaken Miranda by narrowing its reach, rather than overruling it. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren
Court (Was it Really So Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-
Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, reprinted in THE BURGER COURT-THE
CoUN-reR-REvoLrnoN THAT WASN'T at 62 (Vincent Blasi ed. 1983); Sonenshein, supra note 14.
16. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Malloy, the petitioner, while testifying before a referee appointed
by the Superior Court of Hartford County, Connecticut, was asked several questions about illegal
gambling. Id. at 3. The petitioner had pleaded guilty to a gambling charge sixteen months prior to
the hearing, and was on probation at the time of the hearing. Id. When asked questions about his
arrest and gambling activities preceding that arrest, the petitioner refused to answer, citing the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. The Superior Court held him in
contempt and ordered him incarcerated. The Supreme Court granted the petitioner habeas corpus
relief. Id.
17. Id. at 6. The Court drew analogies to its earlier decisions in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959), and Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). The Court noted that these cases
prohibited the use of a confession gained through false sympathy, Spano, 373 U.S. at 323, or other
inducement, Haynes, 373 U.S. at 503. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8. The opinion then applied its
conclusion to the facts of the case by holding that the states may not use penalties, such as
imprisonment, to compel a person to speak. Id. The Court held that, had the petitioner answered
the questions concerning his arrest, he could have potentially implicated himself in a crime or
crimes. Id. at 13-14. Therefore, he properly invoked the privilege against answering those
questions at the hearing. Id.
18. Id. at 33 (White, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice White cited the general duty of a
citizen to testify when subpoenaed, as well as the trial court's ability to determine when an answer
may be incriminating. Id. at 34. Additionally, Justice White applied the traditional process of
determining whether the answer tends to incriminate the witness and found the danger of self-
incrimination to be speculative. Id. at 37-38.
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more learned appraisal of the trial court. 9
Two years later, in his dissent in Miranda v. Arizona,20 Justice
White attacked the majority decision as unsupported by the history or
the language of the Fifth Amendment.2' To substantiate his position,
Justice White advanced five specific objections to the Court's ruling.
First, he identified the privilege as a trial right only, namely that the
government cannot compel the testimony of the accused.22 While noting
that the privilege later embraced coerced confessions, Justice White pos-
19. Id. at 33. At the conclusion of his dissent, Justice White said he would require the witness
to state reasons for asserting the privilege in response to questions. that are "seemingly irrelevant
to any incriminating matters." Id. at 38.
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was a consolidation of four cases involving confessions
given during police interrogations. Id. at 440. In each case, the police neglected to inform the
suspects of their right to remain silent. Id. at 445. The interrogations all yielded confessions, and
three of the suspects signed statements confessing to the crimes. Id. In Miranda v. Arizona, No.
759, the defendant's written confession was admitted as evidence and the jury returned a
conviction for rape. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492. In Vignera v. New York, No. 760, a detective
testified about the defendant's oral confession, and Vignera was found guilty of first degree
robbery. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 493-94. In Westover v. United States, No. 761, the defendant's
two separate confessions were admitted at trial, and the defendant was found guilty of bank
robbery. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 495. These three convictions were subsequently affirmed. In
California v. Stewart, No. 584, the defendant confessed to the crime after the ninth interrogation
session. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 497. At trial, transcripts of the oral confession and a written
confession were admitted in evidence, and the defendant was convicted of robbery and first degree
murder. Id. at 498. The Supreme Court-of California reversedthese convictions and the State of
California appealed. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions in the first three cases and affirmed the
California Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 499. In reaching these decisions, the Court held that
an individual being held for custodial interrogation must be informed of his right to remain silent
during the interrogation. Id. at 467-68. Additionally, the person must be informed of his right to
an attorney during questioning, even if one must be appointed for him. Id. at 471-72. For an in-
depth analysis of the Miranda decision and the roles of the major players, see generally LivA
BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND PoLIcs (1983). See also GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 186
(characterizing the Miranda decision as "a colossal blunder . . . result[ing] in a serious self-
inflicted wound").
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
White challenged the Court to consider all relevant factors in a case of this magnitude. Id. at 532.
Noting that this decision must both weather critical analysis and offer a concrete constitutional
basis for the holding, Justice White stated, "[d]ecisions like these cannot rest alone on syllogism,
metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of natural justice." Id. at 531-32. Later in his dissent,
Justice White stated that the Court
ma[de] new law and new public policy in much the same way that it has in the
course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court
historically has done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue to do until and
unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional distribution of
governmental powers.
Id. at 531 (footnote omitted). See also FuIs-ToN, supra note 14, at 167 (arguing that Justice White
opposed Miranda on the basis of it being inconsistent with prior precedent, rather than incorrect
policy); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In The Beginning: The Talmudic Rule
Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955 (1988).
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526-27 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
19941
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ited that the privilege only concerned itself with forced judicial admis-
sions." In addition, Justice White explored the history of the privilege
against self-incrimination in the context of the Fifth Amendment and the
common law and concluded that the privilege did not encompass a right
to be free from custodial police interrogation. 4
Justice White next challenged the Court's underlying assumption
that compulsion is inherent in every custodial interrogation.25 Using his-
23. Id. (citing E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1,
18 (1949); Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1930)).
24. Id. at 527. Justice White did recognize, however, that the protections against compelled
grand jury testimony and the compulsory production of books and papers enjoy strong
constitutional and historical support. Id. His dissent cited Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), and Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), as examples of cases properly
interpreting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 527
(White, J., dissenting). In Boyd, the Court found that a court-ordered production of papers in a
forfeiture case violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
The Court in Counselman extended the protections granted in Boyd to grand jury testimony,
relying on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Counselman, 142 U.S. at
585-86.
After his dissent in Miranda, Justice White took part in several decisions involving the
privilege against self-incrimination in areas outside of police interrogation. See, e.g., Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (holding, in an opinion joined by Justice White, that a taxpayer
who had regularly given tax records to her accountant could not claim the privilege in response to
an I.R.S. subpoena demanding production of the records); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974) (holding, in an opinion joined by Justice White, that the privilege against self-incrimination
cannot be invoked by a member of a partnership in response to a subpoena for records, even if the
records could incriminate the individual petitioner); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 472 (1975)
(White, J., concurring in result) (arguing that a witness may not be compelled to give
incriminating testimony absent a grant of immunity in a case where the Court held that a trial
judge may not hold an attorney in contempt for advising a client, in good faith, to invoke the Fifth
Amendment); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding, in an opinion joined by
Justice White, that the introduction of records seized under a valid warrant during trial does not
violate the privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)
(holding, in an opinion joined by Justice White, that an owner of a sole proprietorship did not have
to produce records subpoenaed by a grand jury without a grant of immunity); Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (finding, in an opinion joined by Justice White, that a judge's order
compelling the target of a grand jury investigation to sign a release authorizing disclosure of bank
records did not constitute "testimony," and thus, did not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination).
25. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 532-37. He criticized the Court's reliance upon Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), arguing that the Brain decision lacked widespread support from
either British or American authorities. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 527-28. Justice White then
denounced the Court's expansion of Bram, and noted that "[tihe question in Brain was whether a
confession, obtained during custodial interrogation, had been compelled, and if such interrogation
was to be deemed inherently vulnerable the Court's inquiry could have ended there." Id. at 528.
Justice White cited a line of cases in which custodial confessions were admitted despite a lack of
warnings. Id. at 530.
After laying this historical foundation, Justice White stated that "the Court has not discovered
or found the law in making today's decision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources;
what it has done is to make new law and new public policy in much the same way that it has in the
[Vol. 48:511
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tory and precedent, he noted the lack of new data supporting the Court's
decision, and characterized the basis of the Court's opinion as specula-
tive.26 He stated that the majority's "novel conclusion" did not rest on
any traditional rationale for judicial policy-making. 27 In addition, Jus-
tice White commented on the incongruity between admitting a spontane-
ous statement made after arrest, and forbidding the admission of the
accused's response to express questioning.28 He also advocated the con-
tinued use of the "totality of the circumstances test," or some other less
intrusive method of assuring the reliability of in-custody statements.2 9
course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution." Id. at 531. He noted that this type
of policy-making is inherent in the Court's constitutionally defined powers. He indicated,
however, that the Court must offer some justification for such an extension of Constitutional rights
as was done in Miranda. Id. at 531-32:
26. Id. at 532-33. Justice White noted that the Court, while "reject[ing] . . . 70 years'
experience" with its decision in Miranda, could not point to any "sudden inrush of new
knowledge" to justify this departure from precedent. Id. at 532.
27. Id. Justice White stated that the Court's holding:
[does not] reflect[ ] a changing consensus among state courts, or that a succession of
cases had steadily eroded the old rule and proved it unworkable. Rather than
asserting new knowledge, the Court concedes that it cannot truly know what occurs
during custodial questioning, because of the innate secrecy of such proceedings.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice White also noted that the Court neglected to study any actual facts
from the cases to support its decision. Id. at 533. Instead, the Court relied on police manuals that
did not reflect recent Court decisions. Id. at 532-33. Therefore, "by any of the standards for
empirical investigation.., the Court's premise [that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive]
is patently inadequate." Id. at 533.
28. Id. at 533-34. Justice White found this disparity incomprehensible. He noted.that the
pressures surrounding an arrest are similar to interrogation. Id. Therefore, allowing a
spontaneous statement to be admissible, but not an unwarned response to express questioning,
defied common sense. Id.
29. Id. at 534-35. After stressing the historical validity of the totality of the circumstances
test, Justice White stated that "it has never been suggested, until today, that such questioning was
so coercive and accused persons so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to the very
first question following the commencement of custody must be conclusively presumed to be the
product of an overborne will." Id. at 535. To Justice White, such a conclusion had no "rational
foundation." Id.
Justice White offered several alternative measures to the Court's ruling. These measures
would allow the totality of the circumstances test to remain the primary method for evaluating the
voluntariness of a confession and its admissibility. The use of observers, transcripts, time limits,
or other devices would insure that confessions were voluntary. Id. at 535. Justice White also
noted that the safeguards addressed by the majority's decision were traditionally used to determine
the voluntariness of a confession. He said:
The duration and nature of incommunicado custody, the presence or absence of
advice concerning the defendant's constitutional rights, and the granting or refusal
of requests to communicate with lawyers, relatives or friends have all been rightly
regarded as important data bearing on the basic inquiry [into the voluntariness of a
confession].
Id. at 534. Compare Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701-02 (1988) (advocating
the disincorporation of the privilege against self-incrimination from the protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment and allowing judicial confessions to be admissible while prohibiting the
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In his third objection, Justice White chided the Court for placing
the decision to remain silent in the hands of the defense attorney rather
than in the hands of the accused. He explained his objection by first
pointing out the irregularities in the Court's new procedure for waiving
the privilege.30 He then questioned the efficiency of prohibiting the use
of inculpatory statements given without warnings, while allowing a sus-
pect to waive the privilege in the same "coercive" atmosphere. 3' There-
fore, in Justice White's opinion, the Court shifted the "focus [from]...
the will' of the accused, [to] the will of counsel and how much influence
he can have on the accused."32
Justice White's fourth objection to the Miranda decision is based
on his perception that the Court elevated the interest in personal auton-
omy over society's interest in security. Justice White noted that "[m]ore
than the human dignity of the accused is involved; the human personal-
ity of others in the society must also be preserved. '33 According to Jus-
tice White, any advantages the Court's ruling might have are "far
outweighed by [the] likely undesirable impact on other very relevant and
important interests. 34
Finally, Justice White pointed to the inherent reliability of confes-
admissibility of statements made during police interrogation). But see Irene Merker Rosenberg &
Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 69 (1989) (advocating the adoption of a per se rule barring the admissibility of all custodial
confessions).
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 535-36.
31. Id. at 536. He did note that the Court's decision to erect a "severe, if not impossible,"
barrier forces the state to show that the waiver was not itself compelled. Id. Justice White stated
his belief that the Court's decision "for all practical purposes forbids interrogation except in the
presence of counsel." Id. He found this holding unnecessary in light of the distinction between a
compelled confession and a voluntary confession given while in custody. Id.
32. Id. at 537. Justice White concluded this argument by stating that "there is no warrant in
the Fifth Amendment for thus installing counsel as the arbiter of the privilege." Id.
33. Id. at 537. Justice White also stated that "society's interest in the general security" must
be given "equal weight" with the values protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. He
went on to say that the crux of the majority opinion was that the Court saw police interrogation as
"inherently wrong." Id. at 538. That is the main point of difference between the majority opinion
and Justice White's dissent, Justice White believed that there is nothing inherently wrong or
unconstitutional with police questioning. Id. Justice White then recalled Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dissenting), where he stated that the absence of warnings would
be one of many factors in determining voluntariness. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 538.
34. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 539. Justice White characterized the "most basic function of any
government" as the duty to provide continuing protection to the individual and his property. Id.
To this end, society has enacted criminal laws. Id. Therefore, he disparaged the Court's elevation
of the suspect's human dignity over society's security as "idle." Id. He pointed to the preventive
nature of the criminal law. In his view, the Court's decision would hobble society's efforts to
control crime through isolation, deterrence and rehabilitation. Id. at 539-41. By making
confessions, and therefore convictions, harder to obtain, the Court's rule "measurably weaken[ed]
the ability of the criminal law to perform [its] tasks." Id. at 541.
[Vol. 48:5 11
POLICE INTERROGATION
sions.35 He stated that confessions "contribute to the certitude with
which we may believe the accused is guilty," especially when corrobo-
rated by physical evidence.36 Justice White could find no basis for the
Court's assertion that a confession is injurious to the accused; instead, he
saw the possibility of a confession "provid[ing] psychological relief and
enhanc[ing] the prospects for rehabilitation. '37 Ultimately, according to
Justice White, the Court "establish[ed] a new constitutional barrier to the
ascertainment of truth."' 38  He concluded his dissent by characterizing
the Court's decision as a "constitutional straitjacket.
39
When the Court expanded on the protections established in
Miranda, Justice White continued to defend his original criticisms of the
ruling. In Mathis v. United States,40 Justice White dissented from the
majority's decision to reverse a conviction based on the statements an
incarcerated state prisoner gave to an Internal Revenue Service investi-
gator.41 In the first sentence of his dissent, Justice White again reiter-
ated his opposition to Miranda and the basis for that opposition.42 He
further stated that even if he were to accept the rationale for the Miranda
decision, he would not extend it to the present matter.43 Justice White
also cast doubts on the validity of the Miranda doctrine in Garrity v.
35. Id. at 538. Justice White stated that prior to the Court's ruling, "the admissions or
confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the
scale of incriminating evidence." Id. (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 542. See also Caplan, supra note 14, at 1419 ("Miranda was not a wise or
necessary decision ...."). But see Ogletree, supra note 14, at 1827. In his article, Professor
Ogletree finds fault with many of the arguments in Justice White's dissent, particularly Justice
White's predictions that Miranda would cripple law enforcement. Ogletree postulated that the
Miranda warnings are "not an effective means of informing suspects both of the existence and
extent of their privilege against self-incrimination and of their right to consult with counsel before
they make any statements." Id. at 1827-28.
39. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 545. Justice White also noted that the majority's decision, while
purporting to establish a "bright line" rule, nonetheless leaves several questions unresolved for
lower courts. Id. at 544-45. Specifically, these questions are: whether the accused was, in fact,
in custody; whether the statements were spontaneous; whether the accused has validly waived his
rights; and whether non-testimonial evidence was obtained in violation of Miranda. Id. at 545.
40. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court rejected the government's attempts to narrow Miranda to
cases where the suspect is in custody for the crime which is the subject of the investigation. Id. at
4-5. In addition, it refused to limit Miranda to investigations that definitely result in a criminal
prosecution. Id. at 4.
41. Mathis, 391 U.S. 1, 5 (White, J., dissenting).
42. Id. He called for the abandonment of Miranda and the admission of "unquestionably
voluntary" statements. Id. at 5-6.
43. Id. at 6. Justice White characterized the interview as "indistinguishable from the
thousands of inquiries into tax liability made annually." Id. He then expressed disbelief that
Miranda's "checklist of warnings" applied to routine civil inquiries conducted by the government.
Id. at 7. Furthermore, he could find no basis for such an extension in the language of the Miranda
opinion. Id.
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New Jersey." In his dissent in Spevack v. Klein, Garrity's companion
case, Justice White belied the need for the Court's per se. rule barring the
use of statutorily compelled statements and instead urged that a case-by-
case standard be adopted.45
Justice White continued his attack on the Court's expansion of
Miranda in Orozco v. Texas.46 He characterized the Orozco decision as
"a new and unwarranted extreme. '47  Justice White reasoned that the
facts in Orozco did not endanger the rights protected by Miranda. He
pointed to the fact that the interrogation took place in the suspect's room
and that it was relatively brief.48 Therefore, Justice White could find
44. 385 U.S. 493, 530 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). In Garrity, several police officers were
accused of conspiring to "fix" traffic tickets. Id. at 494. As part of the Attorney General's
investigation, the police officers were questioned as to their role in the conspiracy. Prior to the
questioning, the police officers were informed of their right to remain silent, but were additionally
advised that any invocation of that right would result in the loss of their employment. Id. The
police officers answered the questions, which did incriminate them in the conspiracy, and were
subsequently convicted. Id. at 495.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, relied on Miranda to reverse these convictions.
Id. at 500. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the subtle pressures used in this case are
just as coercive as the more overt methods to which the Miranda warnings traditionally apply. Id.
at 497-98. The Court also rejected the argument that a valid waiver allowed the statements to be
admitted, noting that the waivers were the product of duress, not a voluntary attempt to make a
.,clean breast of the whole affair." Id. at 498-99.
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), a companion case to Garrity, dealt with a lawyer
disbarred for refusing to surrender incriminating documents. Spevack. 385 U.S. at 530, 531
(White, J., dissenting).
45. Spevack, 385 U.S. at 530, 531 (White, J., dissenting). But see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973) (holding that a statute requiring all state contractors to submit to potentially
incriminating questioning is unconstitutional in an opinion written by Justice White).
46. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). In Orozco, the petitioner was arrested in his room in a boarding
house several hours after a murder. The petitioner was not advised of his constitutional right to an
attorney or of his right to remain silent. Id. at 326. During the questioning, the petitioner made
several incriminating statements, and subsequently led the police to the location of the murder
weapon. Id. at 325.
The Court decided Miranda after Orozco's arrest, but before his trial; thus, according to
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), Miranda's protections were applicable to the case at
hand. At trial, the petitioner's lawyer unsuccessfully attempted to suppress the incriminating
statements. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 326. The petitioner was then convicted of murder without
malice. Id. at 324. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that the use of the
statements at trial was "a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
as construed in Miranda." Id. at 326. The Court, however, did not render a decision on the
admissibility of the murder weapon to which the petitioner led the police after the interrogation.
This omission was a key point in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). See infra notes 53-54
and accompanying text for a discussion of that case and Justice White's concurring opinion.
47. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 328 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White reiterated his belief that the
Miranda decision was a "constitutional straitjacket," and further proclaimed that it was being
tightened further by the Orozco decision. Id. at 328.
48. Id. at 328-31. In the dissent, Justice White advocated the very points advanced by the
State of Texas and rejected by the majority. He noted that much of the Miranda decision was
devoted to the dangers of coercion brought on by isolated and prolonged interrogation in an
unfamiliar setting. Id. at 328-29. After again stating that Miranda's reach exceeds Miranda's
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none of the coercion that the Miranda majority addressed, and he cer-
tainly saw no reason to apply its protections in this case.49 With these
opinions, Justice White clearly established himself as an opponent to the
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence of the Warren Court and the "barriers"
the Miranda decision erected to the search for truth.
50
With the advent of the Burger Court, however, the more conserva-
tive wing of the Court, including Justice White, began carving out
exceptions to these "barriers," eroding some of Miranda's protections.
In Harris v. New York,5t for example, Justice White voted with the
majority in a decision allowing the limited use of statements taken in
violation of Miranda to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial.52
Similarly, in Michigan v. Tucker53 Justice White concurred in a decision
allowing the prosecution to use'the testimony of a witness whose iden-
need, Justice White charged the Court with overextending Miranda's protections. Id. at 328. He
could find no reason for enlarging the scope of Miranda to include an interrogation conducted
outside the station house and inside the suspect's home. Id. at 329-31.
49. Id. at 331. In Justice White's view, the Court "diluted" the custody requirements set forth
in Miranda. Id. at 330-31. He found this extension of Miranda unjustified in light of the slight
danger of coercion. Id. at 331. It should be noted, however, that Justice Harlan, also a dissenter in
Miranda, concurred in this case out of a stated respect for stare decisis. Id. at 327 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
50. See also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 228 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for basing its decisions on "fuzzy ideology about confessions").
51. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris, the prosecution sought to use statements that were
inadmissible under Miranda to impeach the petitioner's testimony. The trial judge allowed the
statements to be used for impeachment and gave a limiting instruction to the jury. Id. at 223. The
Court affirmed the limited use of the statements, stating that "[t]he shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense." Id. at 226.
52. Id. at 226. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, however, the Miranda opinion stated
that "It]he privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner." Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966)). See also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984)
(holding, in an opinion joined by Justice White, that a "public safety" exception exists to allow the
admissibility of statements made without Miranda warnings).
53. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). The United States Supreme Court found that the use of the witness
obtained from the respondent's unwarned statements did not unconstitutionally infringe on his
right to be free from self-incrimination. Id. at 445-46. Although the interrogation violated the
procedure set forth in Miranda, this was not held to be a constitutional violation because "these
procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right . . . was protected." Id. at 444. The Court reached this
conclusion after an examination of the historical precedent surrounding the right. Id. at 439-44.
Accordingly, the Court found that there was no reason to exclude the witness' testimony. Id. at
452.
The Tucker decision was discussed in Professor Kamisar's article comparing the Warren and
Burger Courts. See Kamisar, supra note 15, at 85-86. He identified Justice Rehnquist's
characterization of Miranda's warnings as "the most ominous note of all" for Miranda supporters.
Id. at 85. Professor Kamisar also noted the inconsistency of the Tucker reasoning with the
underlying rationale of Miranda. He pointed out that the Court's new system of "equat[ing]
'compulsion' within the meaning of the privilege with 'coercion' or 'involuntariness,' " as in the
pre-Miranda cases, "miss[ed] the point" of Miranda. Id. at 85. In Miranda, Professor Kamisar
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tity it obtained from an interrogation preceded by incomplete
warnings.54
Furthermore, in Michigan v. Mosley,5" Justice White concurred in
the result of a decision that upheld the authority of the police to reinter-
rogate an accused who had previously invoked his right to remain silent,
but failed to request an attorney during an interrogation for an unrelated
crime.56 With these opinions, Justice White continued to manifest his
explained, the Court abandoned the harsh "totality of the circumstances" test to safeguard
individual liberty. Id. at 85-86.
54. Michigan v. TuQker, 417 U.S. at 460 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated "I
continue to think that Miranda v. Arizona was ill-conceived and without warrant in the
Constitution." Id. (citations omitted). He then noted that the exact status of this type of evidence
was left open by the Court's decision in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). Justice White also
expressed his reluctance to extend the "prophylactic scope" of Miranda to bar evidence revealed
in unwared interrogations. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 461 (White, J., concurring).
55. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In Mosley, the police arrested the respondent in connection with two
robberies. Id. at 97. He was advised of his rights under Miranda, whereupon he told the police
that he did not want to answer any questions and the police halted the interrogation. Id. He did
not, however, request an attorney. Id. Two hours later, the respondent was questioned by another
police officer regarding a murder. After again being informed of his rights, the respondent denied
any involvement in the murder. Id. at 98. The respondent changed his story when the questioning
officer falsely informed him that another suspect had implicated him in the crime. Id. at 98 n.3.
The respondent then made incriminating statements that he sought to suppress at his trial. Id. at
98. The trial court's decision to allow the statements was reversed by the Michigan Court of
Appeals. Id. at 99.
In deciding the issue, the Supreme Court did not challenge the validity of Miranda; instead,
the Court relied on the peculiar semantics of that decision. The Court noted that Miranda orders a
cessation of interrogation when the suspect expresses a desire to remain silent, but "does not state
under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible." Id. at 101. The
Court interpreted Miranda to mean that police could resume questioning after "a significant period
of time" had elapsed, so long as they gave the suspect "a fresh set of warnings." Id. at 106. The
Court's new test for determining compliance with Miranda was whether the police "scrupulously
honored" the accused's "right to cut off questioning." Id. at 104. In fact, the new set of warnings
was critical in allowing the later use of the confession. See id. at 106-07. Compare Inbau, supra
note 14, at 797-98.
In his article, Professor Inbau examined the impact of Miranda on the case of John W.
Hinckley, Jr., the failed assassin of President Reagan. Professor Inbau blamed Miranda for the
suppression of statements made by Hinckley during F.B.I. questioning. Inbau placed great
emphasis on the fact that Hinckley asked for a lawyer "rather hesitatingly." Id. at 798. In his
view, this loss of evidence which forced the government to prove Hinckley's sanity through
independent evidence was symptomatic of the "mischief" caused by Miranda. Id. at 798, 799.
Professor Inbau concluded that the use of repeated warnings causes suspects to actually exercise
their constitutional right to remain silent when they might have otherwise decided to speak with
the police. Id. at 799. Professor Caplan expressed similar sentiments in his article on Miranda.
See Caplan, supra note 14, at 1451 (stating that the Miranda warnings, "[i]f delivered faithfully
... will encourage the suspect to withhold information").
56. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 107 (White, J., concurring). In his concurrence'Justice White first
expressed his continuing distaste for Miranda stating, "I am no more convinced that Miranda was
required by the United States Constitution than I was when it was decided." Id. at 108. He then
reasoned that the majority's time limit rule was not mandated by Miranda. He further theorized
that the Court would adopt a voluntariness standard to determine the validity of a waiver. Id. at
108. In addition, he noted that the Miranda decision provided an express requirement for the
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distaste for the Miranda decision.57 He sought to disparage Miranda at
every opportunity.58 Justice White's later acceptance of Miranda is
inconceivable in light of these strong criticisms.
B. The Rebirth of Justice White as a Supporter of the Miranda
Doctrine
The erosion of Justice White's opposition to Miranda was signaled
in Rhode Island v. Innis.59 Although the Court ultimately allowed the
use of the accused's statement, it also legitimized Miranda in its deci-
sion.6 ° In Innis, Justice White joined the majority opinion, written by
termination of all interrogation by merely requesting an attorney. Id. at 109-10. He noted that a
waiver of the right to an attorney following a request for counsel "may properly be viewed with
skepticism." Id. at 110 n.2. He also continued to fault Miranda's requirement that questioning
cease after the assertion of the right to silence for being unclear and arbitrary. Id. at 110; see also
Kamisar, supra note 15, at 83-84 (noting that Mosley exemplifies the predicament that proponents
of Miranda faced when arguing cases before a Court that included Justice White, a Miranda
dissenter); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979) (finding that an express waiver
of the right to an attorney is not necessary for the subsequent confession to be admissible in an
opinion joined by Justice White); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727-28 (1979) (holding that a
juvenile's request for his probation officer in response to the Miranda warnings does not
constitute a request for an attorney in an opinion supported by Justice White).
57. The case of United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), presents a rare early example of
Justice White's tolerance of Miranda at some level. In Hale, the Court decided the issue of the
propriety of using a defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes. The Court
declined to resolve the issue on constitutional grounds, and instead found that the prejudicial
effect of such evidence outweighed its probative value. Id. at 173. In his concurrence, however,
Justice White stated that he would affirm the Court's decision on the basis of Miranda's
protections. Id. at 182-83 (White, J., concurring); see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611
(1976) (establishing a rule based on Miranda that post-arrest silence could not be used against a
defendant). But see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980) (finding that the use of
pre-arrest silence to impeach defendant credibility does not violate the Constitution); Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam) (allowing cross-examination concerning pre-arrest
silence in the absence of Miranda warnings).
58. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court
[in Miranda] accepted an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment having 'no significant support in
the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment,' .... ") (citation omitted);
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 328 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that the
original rule amounted to a 'constitutional straitjacket' on law enforcement which was justified
neither by the words or history of the Constitution .... "); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 460
(1974) (White, J., concurring) ("For the reasons stated in my dissent in that case, I continue to
think that Miranda v. Arizona was ill-conceived and without warrant in the Constitution.")
(citation omitted); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182 (1975) (White, J., concurring) ("I am
no more enthusiastic about Miranda v. Arizona now than I was when that decision was
announced." (citation omitted)); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 108 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring) ("I am no more convinced that Miranda was required by the United States
Constitution than I was when it was decided.").
59. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The Court held that a defendant, who had been advised of his right
and invoked the right to counsel, was not interrogated in violation of Miranda when police
officers spoke to each other, in the presence of the defendant, about the missing murder weapon
and its proximity to a school for handicapped children. Id. at 294-95.
60. The Court's rationale strengthened the Miranda holding. In defining interrogation for the
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Justice Stewart, wherein the Court expanded the definition of interroga-
tion to include "express questioning" and its "functional equivalent."61
Of additional importance is the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Bur-
ger which stated that he would "neither overrule Miranda, disparage it,
nor extend it at this late date."62 The Innis decision exemplifies the con-
servative Burger Court's validation of the Miranda doctrine.
Ultimately, the decision penned by Justice White in Edwards v.
Arizona6 3 shows how far he removed himself from his dissent in
Miranda. In a remarkable reversal, Justice White rejected the Arizona
Supreme Court's use of a pure voluntariness standard in assessing the
admissibility of a confession." Instead, the Court reaffirmed Miranda's
requirement that "waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but
must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a
known right or privilege. 65 The Court then broadened the parameters
of Miranda in a per se rule stating that an accused who has requested
purposes of Miranda, the Court expanded the original holding. The Court "conclude[d] that the
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent." Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added). To clarify this
definition, the Court held that any words or actions "that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response" will be considered an interrogation. Id. at 301.
61. Id. at 302.
62. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
63. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Edwards, the petitioner was arrested for burglary, robbery, and
murder, and was advised of his rights. He indicated that he was willing to answer questions. Id.
at 478. The police officers told the petitioner that an accomplice had implicated him in the crimes.
The petitioner then told the police that he" 'want[ed] an attorney before making a deal.' " Id. at
479. The police ended the interrogation and took the petitioner to the county jail. After spending
the night in his holding cell, the petitioner was informed that "he 'had' to talk" with two
detectives. Id. The detectives, after again informing the petitioner of his Miranda rights, played
an accomplice's tape-recorded statement implicating the petitioner in the crimes for which he was
arrested. Id. After listening to the tape, the petitioner stated that he would make a statement, so
long as it was not tape-recorded. Id. The officers informed the petitioner that a recording was
irrelevant, as they could testify in court as to what he said. Id. The petitioner then made
incriminating statements about the crimes. Id. At trial, the petitioner's attorney tried
unsuccessfully to suppress the statements. Id. at 479-80. The petitioner was convicted of
burglary and murder. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction based on a violation of the
petitioner's rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 480.
64. Id. at 482. Justice White reasoned that the Arizona Supreme Court erred when it focused
solely on the voluntary nature of the waiver. Id. Instead, the trial court should have concerned
itself with whether the suspect had knowingly and intelligently yielded the right to counsel. Id. at
483. Justice White characterized the Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation of the law as a
"misunder[standing of] the requirement for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once
invoked." Id. at 484. Compare Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 108 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court would adopt a voluntariness standard to determine the validity
of a waiver).
65. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482. Later, Justice White stated "an accused ... is not subject to
further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id.
at 484-85.
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counsel cannot be subjected to further interrogation until an attorney is
"made available to him."66 With this decision, Justice White's disdain
for Miranda was silenced by his own words when he said:
Miranda itself indicated that the assertion of the right to counsel was
a significant event and that once exercised by the accused, "the inter-
rogation must cease until an attorney is present." Our later cases
have not abandoned this view. In Michigan v. Mosley, the Court
noted that Miranda had distinguished between the procedural safe-
guards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an
attorney and had required that interrogation cease until an attorney
was present only if the individual stated that he wanted counsel. In
Fare v. Michael C., the Court referred to Miranda's "rigid rule that
an accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his
Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease." And
just last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had invoked his
Miranda right to counsel, the Court again referred to the "undisputed
right" under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation
"until he had consulted with a lawyer." We reconfirm these views
and, to lend them substance, emphasize that it is inconsistent with
Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to
reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his
right to counsel.
67
The Court, in an opinion joined by Justice White, further refined
Edwards when it decided Arizona v. Roberson.6" In Roberson, the Court
explained that the suspect's invocation of the right to counsel precludes
all further police-initiated interrogation on related and unrelated
offenses.6 9 The Court rejected the distinction between an interrogation
66. Id. at 484-85. It should also be noted that Chief Justice Burger opted for the use of the
knowing and intelligent waiver standard under Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), to measure
the waiver of the right to counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 488 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the
judgment). In addition, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, rejected Justice White's per
se approach, but not Miranda. Id. at 489-90 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). But see Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding that failure to inform suspect of his attorney's attempts
to reach him did not render the suspect's waiver of Miranda rights invalid); Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564 (1987) (finding that defendant does not have to be informed of the nature of the
crimes he will be questioned about to execute a valid waiver).
67. Edwards, 451 U.S. 485 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
68. 486 U.S. 675 (1988). In Roberson, the respondent had asserted his right to counsel after
being arrested for a burglary. Id. at 678. While still in police custody, the respondent was
questioned by another police officer concerning a separate burglary. Id. During this interrogation,
the respondent made an incriminating statement. Id. The trial court's decision to suppress the
statement was affirmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id. at 678-79. The Supreme Court
affirmed this decision, rejecting the state's attempts to carve an exception to Edwards based on a
separate offense theory. Id. at 687-88.
69. Id. at 684-85. In reaching its decision, the Court distinguished the case from Mosley v.
Michigan, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The Court differentiated asserting the right to remain silent from
requesting the aid of counsel. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680-84. The former assertion does not
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arising from the original arrest and one arising from a new investiga-
tion.70 Therefore, after Roberson, all police-initiated interrogation must
cease after a suspect requests counsel.
The Court then recognized the outer limits of Miranda and
Edwards in Minnick v. Mississippi.7 There, a majority of the Court,
including Justice White, held that the suspect's right to be free from
unwanted police-initiated interrogation continues even after the suspect
confers with counsel, and that a suspect who had previously invoked the
right to counsel could not be interrogated without his attorney being
present.7 2 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the importance
that Miranda and Edwards placed on having counsel present during
interrogation. 73 The Court reasoned that, notwithstanding earlier consul-
inform the police that the suspect is unwilling to proceed without the aid of counsel. Id. at 683.
Specifically relying on Mosley, the Court stated that "a suspect's decision to cut off questioning,
unlike his request for counsel, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to proceed without
a lawyer's advice." Id. (emphasis added). The Court then strengthened this distinction by citing
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987), where the defendant himself distinguished between
oral statements that he would make alone, and written statements that he would make only with a
lawyer present. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683-84. It was, therefore, a limited request for counsel.
With these distinctions in mind, the Court characterized the State of Arizona's argument that
Roberson's requests were similarly limited as "flawed both factually and legally." Id. at 683. To
support this contention, the Court noted that Roberson "stated that 'he wanted a lawyer before
answering any questions.' " Id. (citing police report). The Court also stated that the suspect's
need for counsel "does not disappear simply because the police have approached [him] ... about a
separate investigation." Id. In addition, the Court precluded the nascent "good faith" exception
by stating that the second interrogator's ignorance of the suspect's request for counsel was of no
importance. Id. at 687-88.
70. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88.
71. 498 U.S. 146 (1990). Justice Kennedy, who dissented in Roberson, delivered the Court's
opinion. The Court stated that the "clear and unequivocal" procedures set forth in Edwards and
refined in Roberson governed this case. Id. at 151. The Court reasoned that the initial request for
counsel halts all subsequent interrogations without an attorney present. Id. at 153. In reaching its
decision, the Court noted that this case is illustrative of the continuing need for counsel at all
interrogations, as well as the abuses and pressures inherent in custody. Id. at 154.
72. Id. at 153. Compare Ogletree, supra note 14, at 1830. In his article, written before the
Court's decision in Minnick, Professor Ogletree proposed that per se rules be adopted barring the
interrogation of criminal suspects without an attorney present. Id. Professor Ogletree supported
the Miranda decision and was critical only of its practical ineffectiveness at informing criminal
suspects of their constitutional rights during interrogation. Id. at 1827-28. Ogletree's per se rule,
however, would have allowed the confession in Minnick. See id. at 1830. Therefore, the Minnick
Court's extension of Miranda's protections beyond the position of even this strong supporter of
Miranda indicates the dramatic shift in the area of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence exhibited by
Justice White and the rest of the Court.
73. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 150-53. The Edwards Court's insistence on the attorney's presence
is "not unique," the Court reasoned in Minnick, but stems from Miranda's purpose of insuring
" 'that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of
compulsion.' " Id. at 152 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966)). The majority
also noted that the lawyer's absence deprived the petitioner of crucial advice regarding the
admissibility of any statements he made. Specifically, the Court stated:
[o]ne plausible interpretation of the record is that petitioner thought he could keep
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tations between the suspect and his attorney, the suspect's will "can be
swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process," when the attorney
is not present throughout the interrogation.74 Therefore, after Edwards,
Roberson, and Minnick, a suspect who requests an attorney cannot be
subsequently interrogated outside of his attorney's presence, regardless
of whether the interrogation concerns the crime for which the suspect
was initially arrested or some other investigation."
The procedures for in-custody interrogation were also clarified in
his admissions out of evidence by refusing to sign a formal waiver of rights. If the
authorities had complied with Minnick's request to have counsel present during
interrogation, the attorney could have corrected Minnick's misunderstanding, or
indeed counseled him that he need not make a statement at all.
Minnick, 498 U.S. at 154. Compare Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
74. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 154 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966)).
75. These decisions did not affect police interrogation of a suspect who did not request
counsel. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), for example, the Court held that the police do
not have to inform a suspect of his attorney's attempts to reach him before interrogation. Id. at
424. In Burbine, the respondent was arrested for a burglary. The respondent's sister contacted the
public defender who agreed to act as her brother's attorney. Id. at 416-17. The attorney phoned
the police station and received assurances from an officer that the police "were through with
[Burbine] for the night." Id. at 417. While the respondent was in custody, police officers from
another city began questioning him about an unrelated murder. Id. The respondent signed several
waivers and confessed to the murder after being informed of his rights to an attorney and to
remain silent. Id. at 417-18. In deciding to allow the confession, the majority, including Justice
White, placed great emphasis on the fact that the respondent did not request an attorney and was
unaware of the fact that his sister had arranged for his representation. See id. at 422-24.
Similarly, in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987), a majority of the Court, which included
Justice White, found that the police are not required to keep a suspect informed of important
developments or to tell him what crimes they wish to interrogate him about for a waiver to be
valid. Id. at 574. In Spring, the respondent waived his right to remain silent in response to
questioning about the illegal transportation of firearms. While answering questions concerning
this offense, however, the respondent made incriminating statements about an unrelated murder.
Id. at 567. ,The Court found that the failure by the police to supply the respondent with new
information did not invalidate his waiver. Id. at 577.
On the same day the Court decided Spring, Justice White joined the majority in Connecticut
v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987). In Barrett, the Court found that an accused could invoke the right
to counsel for written statements without invoking the same right for oral statements. Id. at 529.
The Court found that the respondent invoked the right to an attorney's presence for any written
statements by refusing to give any written accounts without his attorney present. Id. The Court
also held that the respondent validly waived his right to remain silent when he said that he "had
'no problem' in talking about the incident." Id. at 525, 529-30. To reach this conclusion, the
Court distinguished the right to remain silent from the right to refuse to give a written statement in
the absence of an attorney. Id. at 528-30. Therefore, by exercising the latter right only, the
respondent's oral statements were not protected by the right to counsel. Id. at 528-30. Compare
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (interpreting a suspect's refusal to sign a waiver
as a belief that no oral statements could be used against him at trial).
In contrast, the Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991), declined to expand
this principle by refusing to equate a Sixth Amendment invocation as a preclusion of Fifth
Amendment interrogation. Id. at 2209-11. Justice Scalia, for the Court, stated that "[tihe Sixth
Amendment right ... is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions
. .. Id. at 2207. See infra notes 112-122 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of
McNeil.
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Berkemer v. McCarty.7 6 In a decision joined by Justice White, the Court
reaffirmed Miranda's "central principle" by stating that a suspect's
unwarned statements could not be used against him." In its decision,
the Court rejected attempts to create a "misdemeanor exception" to
Miranda's protections.7" The Court indicated that the petitioner's pro-
posed set of rules and exceptions would render the Miranda rule less
than clear.79 In addition, the Court noted that the police were well-
accustomed to giving the Miranda warnings.80 As a result, Miranda
warnings would not "significantly hamper the efforts of the police to
investigate crimes."' The Court also addressed the status, for Miranda
purposes, of a traffic stop. 2 The Court rejected the respondent's posi-
tion advocating that all traffic stops should be treated as arrests for
Miranda purposes.8 3 The Court did state, however, that a traffic stop
would be transformed into an arrest with its accompanying warnings
76. 468 U.S. 420 (1983). The respondent was stopped by a highway patrolman for driving
erratically. The patrolman made a decision to arrest the respondent almost immediately after the
respondent exited his car in a disoriented fashion. Id. at 423. After the respondent failed a
"balancing test," the patrolman asked him if he had used any intoxicants. Id. The respondent
stated that he had smoked marijuana and drank beer that night. Id. The patrolman then arrested
the respondent and conveyed him to the police station. Id. While at the station, a blood test failed
to show any alcohol in the respondent's system. Id. The respondent, in answer to the patrolman's
question, stated that he was "barely" under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 424. The respondent
was never informed of his right to remain silent or his right to an attorney at any time during these
occurrences. Id. The respondent was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated
and later granted habeas corpus relief. Id. at 424-25. The Court affirmed the decision to grant
relief based on the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 434-35.
77. Id. at 429.
78. Id. at 430. In reaching this decision, the Court noted the difficulty of determining the
precise nature of the ultimate charge at the time of arrest. Id. In addition, the Court pointed to the
fact that the exact offense may well depend on facts unknown to the police at the time of the initial
stop. Id. at 430-31.
79. Id. at 431. The Court briefly noted the foreseeable problems to the petitioner's proposed
system. The escalation of investigations, the dividing line between misdemeanors and felonies,
and the litigation that would follow to determine these points were some of the Court's concerns.
Id. at 431-32.
80. Id. at 434.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 435-40.
83. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that Miranda
mandated that the police give warnings whenever they issue a citation for a traffic offense because
a traffic stop "deprive[s a person] of his freedom of action in [a] significant way." Id. at 435
(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). To support this position, the Court cited
the brevity that accompanies the average traffic stop, as well as the more relaxed circumstances in
which such events occur. Id. at 437-38. The Court did note that an "aura of authority"
accompanies the police officer, and that this may "exert some pressure on the detainee to respond
to questions." Id. at 438. The Court reasoned that these pressures are offset by the public nature
of the typical traffic stop. Id. at 438. As such, the Court analogized a traffic stop to a "Terry
stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which allows a police officer to detain a person
without probable cause. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439. Therefore, as in Terry, there is no
requirement for Miranda warnings. Id. at 440.
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when the motorist is actually, or is in effect, placed "in custody". 4
The Court then addressed the role of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the context of booking procedure in
Pennsylvania v. Muniz.85 In a divided opinion,86 the Court determined
that an accused who is in custody and is asked to respond to questions
aimed at eliciting "an express or implied assertion of fact or belief...
confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity, or silence, and hence the
response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial com-
ponent."87 As a result, responses to such questions are inadmissible.88
Justice White joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which focused
almost exclusively on the majority's characterization of the booking
84. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
85. 496 U.S. 582 (1990). In this case, a drunk driver failed several field sobriety tests and
informed the officer that he had been drinking. Id. at 585. He was not advised of his rights under
Miranda. Id. at 585-86. The respondent was asked several questions during the procedure,
including his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, current age, and the date of
his sixth birthday. Id. In the course of the booking process, the respondent made several
incriminating statements and actions. While attempting sobriety tests, the respondent also made
several incriminating statements. Id. The booking interview and the sobriety tests were
videotaped and later admitted at trial. Id. at 587. The trial court overruled the respondent's
motion to suppress the video and audio evidence, and later refused to grant a new trial based on
the failure to suppress such evidence. Id. This decision was reversed by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. Id. at 588. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case. Id. at 606.
86. The Court was divided on several aspects of this case. A majority of the Court, including
Justice White, agreed that the respondent's slurred responses to questions were properly admitted.
Id. at 592. In reaching this decision, the majority differentiated between testimonial and physical
evidence. Testimonial responses could not be compelled under Miranda. Id. at 591-92. A
different majority (Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy) agreed that the
response to the question, "what was the date on your sixth birthday?" was testimonial in nature
and, therefore, inadmissible. Id. at 600. The majority reasoned that the response to this question
did not involve an allowable inquiry into the suspect's physical state, but rather concerned
personal knowledge of fact or belief. Id. at 598-99. Therefore, the suspect was impermissibly
asked to incriminate himself. Id. at 599. A majority of the Court also agreed that the responses to
the booking questions were admissible, although for different reasons. Id. at 601-02, 606 (opinion
of C.J. Rehnquist) (joined by Justice White). In addition, a majority of the Court, again including
Justice White, agreed that the respondent's statements made during the sobriety tests were
admissible, as the statements were not made in response to interrogation, but were, instead,
voluntary. Id. at 605.
87. Id. at 597 (footnote omitted). The Court clarified this example by noting the difference
between compelling physical evidence, such as blood samples or handwriting exemplars, and
compelling the admission of culpability. Id. at 598. The Court stated that "the definition of
'testimonial' evidence ... must encompass all responses to questions that, if asked of a sworn
suspect during a criminal trial, could place the suspect in the 'cruel trilemma.' " Id. at 597. See
generally Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, to Balk, or to Lie: The Emerging Fifth
Amendment Doctrine of the "Preferred Response", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 521 (1982) (discussing
the "cruel trilemma" and the efforts of states to place criminal suspects in the position of having to
choose between being punished for remaining silent, committing perjury or incriminating
themselves).
88. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600.
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questions.89 The dissent would have enlarged the "booking exception"
recognized by the majority.9'
Additional questions concerning interrogation, specifically the ade-
quacy of warnings and the absence of warnings were examined in Duck-
worth v. Eagan9' and Illinois v. Perkins,92 respectively. Justice White
joined the majority's opinion in Duckworth, which reaffirmed Miranda,
yet found that the Constitution does not mandate rigid adherence to the
exact wording of the warnings. 9 While clinging to the language of
Miranda,94 the Court held that the warnings given in Duckworth
"touched all of the bases required." 95 The Court noted that the
police told respondent that he had the right to remain silent, that any-
thing he said could be used against him in court, that he had the right
to speak to an attorney before and during questioning, that he had
'this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if [he could]
not afford to hire one,' and that he had the 'right to stop answering at
89. Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Chief Justice noted
that he agreed with the majority's conclusion that the seven "booking" questions were properly
admitted, albeit for different reasons. Id. Nevertheless, he could not accept the majority's
rationale that the response to the sixth birthday question implicated Miranda concerns. Id. The
Chief Justice compared the response to the question as more akin to complying with requests for
handwriting samples or voice comparison. Id. at 607. He characterized it as a "simple
mathematical exercise." Id. Therefore, he saw "no reason why [the police could] not examine the
functioning of Muniz's mental processes" to determine if he was sober. Id.
90. Id. at 608.
91. 492 U.S. 195 (1989). In Duckworth, the crucial issue was whether the police adequately
warned the suspect. The warnings did not follow the typical Miranda wording and instead
informed the respondent of his right to have an attorney present during questioning, his right to
remain silent and his right to have an attorney appointed; the divergence occurred when the
respondent was informed that an attorney would be appointed for him, "if and when [he went] to
court." Id. at 197-98. After receiving these warnings, the respondent signed a waiver and
confessed to the murder. Id. at 198-99. The confession was admitted at trial over the
respondent's objection, and he was convicted. Id. The respondent was later granted habeas
corpus relief. Id. at 200. The Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the respondent's
argument that the warnings were ambiguous and reversed the decision granting habeas corpus
relief. d. at 205.
92. 496 U.S. 292 (1990). See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Perkins.
93. 492 U.S. at 200-01. The Court noted that Miranda does not require a "talismanic"
recitation of the warnings. Id. at 202-03. In attempting to justify its decision, the Court noted that
the exact wording of the Miranda warnings is not always available to the police. Furthermore,
elaboration may be required in some cases. Id. at 203. The modified warnings were also
vindicated as anticipating a suspect's question about the availability of an attorney. Id. at 204.
Finally, the Court stated that Miranda merely requires that the suspect be informed of his right to
an attorney; it does not require the immediate production of a lawyer. Id.
94. Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the following phrase from Miranda: "[tihe warnings
required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a
fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by the
defendant." Id. at 202 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966)).
95. Id. at 203. See also California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam) (holding that
the .specific order of Miranda warnings is irrelevant for purposes of waiver).
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any time until [he] talked to a lawyer.'9 6
The Court reasoned that these warnings fully apprised the respondent of
his rights.97
In Perkins, Justice White joined the majority's opinion that limited
the necessity for Miranda warnings to instances where the suspect
knows that he is talking to a law enforcement officer.9" Though again
reaffirming the validity of Miranda,99 the Court stated that Miranda
must be "enforced strictly," but only to prevent the dangers against
which it protects.1°° According to the Court, those concerns were not
implicated here. 101 The hazards of coercion and compulsion are not
present when the conversation takes place between a suspect and a pre-
sumed cellmate. 10 2 Furthermore, Miranda does not protect a suspect
96. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203. The exact warnings given to the respondent and reproduced
in the Court's opinion were as follows:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the
right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have
a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have
him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of
a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a
lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court.
Id. at 198.
97. Id. at 205. The Court offered several reasons for this position. First, the Court noted that
the warnings "accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana." Id.
at 204. Indiana law provides for the appointment of counsel at the defendant's initial appearance
in court, and charges must be filed at or before this appearance. Id. The Court further reasoned
that the "if and when" language of the warnings "simply anticipates" a suspect's question of when
he will receive counsel. Id. Second, the Court noted that Miranda does not mandate that a
"station house lawyer" be present to advise a suspect of his rights. Id. Instead, it proscribes
questioning of a suspect without a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Id. The Court also
distinguished its decision in California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981), which "suggested that
Miranda warnings would not be sufficient 'if... the right to appointed counsel was linked [to a]
future point in time after the police interrogation.' " Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 204. According to
the Court, the key distinction was that the police in Prysock did not inform the suspect of his right
to have counsel present during questioning. Id. at 205.
98. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). In Perkins, the respondent made incriminating
statements concerning a murder while talking with an undercover police agent in a county jail.
The agent "suggested" to the respondent and another inmate "that the three of them escape." Id. at
295. After stating that "he would be responsible for any murder that occurred [during the escape,
the agent] asked respondent if he had ever 'done' anybody." Id. The respondent then made his
incriminating statements to the agent. Id. At trial and on review, the respondent's motion to
suppress the jailhouse confession was successful. Id. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, reversed the suppression. Id. at 300.
99. Id. at 296. The Court reiterated that the holding in Miranda prevents the admission of
custodial statements without a prior warning, because of the "inherently compelling pressures" of
custodial interrogation. Id.
100. Id. at 296 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)).
101. Id. at 297-98. The Court stated that "[c]onversations between suspects and undercover
agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda.'? Id. at 296. The Court reasoned that
the "essential ingredients" of compulsion are missing. Id.
102. Id. at 296-97. The Court reasoned that the "coercive atmosphere is lacking" when a
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from "strategic deception."103 The Court could find no violation of the
Fifth Amendment and held that the statement was voluntary."t °
The Perkins decision, however, must be read in conjunction with
Arizona v. Fulminante,105 which also dealt with the use of an undercover
informant in a jail setting. In the majority opinion, Justice White, rely-
ing on the totality of the circumstances test, established that the respon-
dent's confession was coerced, and that its admission prejudiced his
case.' 0 6 Justice White could not muster the votes to hold that "the harm-
less-error rule is inapplicable to erroneously admitted coerced confes-
sions."' 10 7 Writing for himself and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
suspect converses with an assumed equal. Id. at 296. The Court also stated that the fear of
reprisal or hope of lenient treatment is also missing in such circumstances. Id. at 296-97.
103. Id. at 297. Here, the Court relied on the language of Miranda that "[any statement given
freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence."
Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)). The Court also stated that tricks do not
rise to the level of compulsion. Id. In addition, the Court noted that the respondent "spoke at his
own peril" when he "boast[ed] about [his] criminal activities." Id. at 298.
104. Id. at 300. The Court also distinguished several Sixth Amendment cases from the case at
hand, namely, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S.
264 (1980); and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985). Perkins, 496 U.S. at 299. The Court
stated that those cases dealt with circumvention of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel through
the use of undercover agents after the right to counsel had attached. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 299.
Here, no charges were filed concerning the crime about which the respondent made incriminating
statements. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment cases did not apply. Id.
105. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). In Fulminante, the respondent was incarcerated in New York
when he befriended an F.B.I. informant posing as an organized crime member. Id. at 1250. The
informant told the respondent that the prison population knew of the respondent's involvement
with an unrelated murder of his step-daughter in Arizona. Id. As a result, the respondent began to
experience a rough time from the other prisoners. Id. The informant offered to help the
respondent in exchange for information concerning the murder. Id. After repeated denials, the
respondent confessed to the murder. Id. Shortly after his release from prison, the respondent was
indicted for the murder of his step-daughter in Arizona. Before the trial, the respondent tried to
suppress the confession he made to the informant and the informant's wife. Id. The trial judge
denied the motion and allowed the use of the confessions and the respondent was convicted. Id. at
1251. The conviction was reversed by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. The Court, in an opinion
by Justice White, found that the confession was coerced and that its admission required reversal.
Id. at 1251-61.
106. The Court reasoned that the "credible threat" to the respondent's safety were sufficient to
show coercion. Id. at 1253. When determining the effect that the confession had on the trial, the
Court noted that "[a] confession is like no other evidence." Id. at 1257. The Court further posited
that a full confession may be the sole deciding piece of evidence in a criminal case. Id. The Court
then examined the facts in the case at hand. The Court noted that the confessions were the key
pieces of evidence, without which the case would not have reached the trial level. Id. at 1258. In
addition, the two confessions relied on each other for mutual support; without the one, the other
would surely fall. Id. at 1259. Finally, the confessions led to the introduction of highly
prejudicial evidence with little probative value. Id. at 1259-60. The Court also noted that the
confessions played a role in the sentencing hearing. Id. at 1260.
107. See id. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke for the Court
on the issue of the proper standard in this case. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1263 (opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.). He noted that in cases involving "trial errors," the harmless error standard is
properly utilized in conjunction with the other evidence presented. Id. at 1264. Nonetheless, he
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Stevens, Justice White castigated the Court for using a harmless error
standard in reviewing a trial where a coerced confession had been admit-
ted as evidence.
108
The Fulminante decision, although decided on due process
grounds, signifies the sweeping changes in Justice White's position on
the protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. For example, in the
dissenting portion of his opinion, Justice White clearly abandoned his
earlier view that the Fifth Amendment encompassed only the right to be
free from compelled judicial admissions. t°9 The dissent also noted the
distinction between a violation of due process and a violation of the
Sixth Amendment. i"0 Justice White's abandonment of the "search for
distinguished the use of a coerced confession from the right to counsel and the right to trial before
an impartial judge. The basis for distinguishing these rights, which were previously treated alike,
lies in the fact that the attorney and the judge are part of the "structural ... framework" of a trial,
rather than a mere component of the trial process itself. Id. at 1265. To bolster this assertion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to the ease with which the impact of a coerced confession on the
trial can be gauged against the other evidence. Id. The Chief Justice did admit, however, that the
impact of a coerced confession may be more "dramatic" than other erroneously admitted
evidence. Id. at 1266. Such an occurrence could be readily corrected by a reviewing court, in the
Chief Justice's opinion. Id.
108. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting in part). In his dissent, Justice White
cited the tradition, memorialized in several cases, of treating coerced confessions as grounds for
an automatic reversal, Id. He then strongly questioned the majority's attempt to distinguish the
coerced confession from other reversible errors by labeling it a harmless trial error. Id. at 1254-
55. He dismissed the distinction as illusory in light of precedent. Justice White also pointed out
the inherent difficulty facing a reviewing court in assessing the weight a particular jury may have
given to the confession. Id. at 1255. In addition, Justice White noted that the use of coerced
confessions "may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial." Id. Compare Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he found the admission of a
coerced confession to be "inconsistent" with an accusatorial system of justice. Id. at 1256.
Finally, he proclaimed that the use of a coerced confession "render[s] a trial fundamentally
unfair." Id. at 1257 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 n.6 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)).
109. Id. at 1253-57. Justice White wrote that the majority "overrule[d a] vast body of
precedent without a word and in so doing dislodge[d] one of the fundamental tenets of our
criminal justice system" by applying a harmless error standard to coerced confessions. Id. at
1254. He justified this position by stating that a "coerced confession is fundamentally different
from other types of erroneously admitted evidence." Id. The logic and tone of this dissent mirrors
his dissent in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 527 (1966) (White, J., dissenting), yet totally
departs from his position there that the Fifth Amendment concerned itself only with compelled
judicial admissions.
This new outlook also influenced the majority opinion Justice White wrote concerning the
admissibility of the confession under the harmless error standard. He stated that a "confession is
like no other evidence." Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1257. In addition, when analyzing
Fulminante's confession, Justice White noted that a full confession revealing motive and means
may "tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision." Id. at 1258. He
also noted that in Fulminante, the circumstances of the confession demonstrated its lack of
absolute reliability. Id. at 1258.
110. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1256. Justice White first noted that "the majority overlooks the
obvious" in its characterization that no "meaningful distinction" exists between a due process
violation and a Sixth Amendment violation. Id. The key to differentiating the two lies in the
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truth" rationale denotes another critical aspect of Fulminante.11
Finally, Fulminante demonstrates the level of importance Justice White
accords to due process considerations in the law of confessions.
Justice White's conversion to the Miranda doctrine is firmly
embedded in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. In McNeil v. Wiscon-
sin'12 he joined the majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia," 3 which
distinguished the right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment
presence or absence of coercion. None of the cases relied on by the majority involved coerced
confessions as was the case in Fulminante. As Justice White stated:
[s]ome coerced confessions may be untrustworthy. Consequently, admission of
coerced confessions may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial upon which
the majority focuses. More importantly, however, the use of coerced confessions,
"whether true or false," is forbidden "because the methods used to extract them
offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is
an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth[.]" This reflects
the "strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed
where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a
confession out of an accused against his will," as well as "the deep-rooted feeling
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves[.]" Thus, permitting
a coerced confession to be part of the evidence on which a jury is free to base its
verdict of guilty is inconsistent with the thesis that ours is not an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice.
Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 1257. Justice White signaled his departure from this rationale in the dissent when
he stated that "the admission of coerced confessions may distort the truth-seeking function of the
trial upon which the majority focuses." Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). Later, Justice White
devotes the following paragraph to the "search for truth":
The search for truth is indeed central to our system of justice, but "certain
constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis
because those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking
function of the trial." The right of a defendant not to have his coerced confession
used against him is among those rights, for using a coerced confession "abort[s] the
basic trial process" and "render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair."
Id. at 1257 (citations omitted).
112. 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991). In McNeil, the petitioner was arrested in Nebraska on an
outstanding warrant for armed robbery in Wisconsin. Id. at 2206. After his arrest, the petitioner
met with two deputy sheriffs from Milwaukee County to transport him back to Wisconsin. Id.
The deputies informed the petitioner of his rights under Miranda, and the petitioner refused to
answer any questions concerning the crime for which he was arrested. Id. The petitioner did not,
however, request an attorney. Id. At a preliminary examination, an attorney from the Public
Defender's office represented the petitioner. Id. While the petitioner was in jail, a detective
questioned the petitioner about a new series of crimes distinct from the armed robbery for which
he was originally arrested: murder, attempted murder, and armed burglary. Id. During the first
interview, after waiving his rights under Miranda, the petitioner denied participating in the crimes.
Id. The detective returned with more officers to conduct a second interview two days later. Id.
After again waiving his rights under Miranda, the petitioner confessed to involvement in these
crimes. Id. at 2206-07. At the trial for the second series of crimes, the petitioner unsuccessfully
sought to suppress these statements. Id. at 2207.
[Vol. 48:5 11
POLICE INTERROGATION
from the right to have an attorney present during questioning protected
by the Fifth Amendment. 1 4 The Court began its opinion by noting that
the Sixth Amendment right is "offense-specific."' 15 The Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees the accused the expertise of an attorney in adverse pro-
ceedings with the government after the government has committed itself
to prosecution.1 6 In contrast, the accused invokes the right to an attor-
ney under the Fifth Amendment to utilize the attorney's expertise when
responding to police questioning. 1 7 In short, the Fifth Amendment
shields a suspect from police interrogation.'1 8  The Court found, how-
ever, that the invocation of one right does not invoke the other." 9 To
properly invoke the Miranda rights, a suspect must indicate that he
desires the aid of an attorney during questioning. 2 ° Merely accepting
the appointment of counsel at a preliminary examination does not acti-
vate the Miranda protections.' 2' After explaining the distinctions
between the two rights, the Court found that an invocation of the right to
113. In addition to Justice White, Justices Souter, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined the opinion. Id. at 2206.
114. Id. at 2209. Note that this decision departed from Justice Scalia's stance on Fifth
Amendment issues in the context of confessions.
115. Id. at 2207. Justice Scalia noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "cannot be
invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. In McNeil, the petitioner made his inculpatory
statements before the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached for the crimes to which he
confessed. As such, the Court reasoned, "that right poses no bar to the admission of the
statements in this case." Id. at 2208.
116. Id. at 2208-09.
117. Id. at 2208. The Court noted that the prophylaxis had two layers, the protections
established in Miranda and the additional safeguards set forth in Edwards and Minnick. Id. The
Court further noted that the guarantees of the Edwards rule are "not offense specific." Id. In fact,
a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel under Miranda may not be approached with any
additional questions until his attorney is present. Id.
118. Id. at 2208. The Court stated that the guarantees of the Miranda line of cases preserve the
suspect's decision "to deal with the police only through counsel." Id. at 2209. Justice Scalia then
noted that the rights guaranteed by Miranda and its progeny are "in one respect narrower ... and
in another respect broader" than the rights protected by the Sixth Amendment. Id. He continued
by stating that "invok[ing] the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the
Miranda-Edwards interest." Id.
119. Id. at 2209.
120. Id. Justice Scalia stated that the invocation of the right to counsel guaranteed by Miranda
and Edwards "requires at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be [sic]
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by
the police." Id. at 2209. Here, the Court could not equate the request for an attorney at a bail
hearing with a request for an attorney to act as an intermediary between the suspect and the police
as Miranda allows. Id.
121. Id. at 2209-10. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its holding and reasoning
in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). The Court noted that Jackson held that any
statements made as a result of police-initiated interrogation after the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches are inadmissible, even if the suspect attempts to waive his rights. Id. at 2209.
The critical language of Jackson, however, was its rejection of the notion that Miranda rights and
Sixth Amendment rights are "equivalent." Id. at 2209-10.
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counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not invoke it under the Fifth
Amendment.'22
Just prior to his retirement, Justice White further distanced himself
from his original opposition to Miranda in two habeas corpus cases
decided on the same day, Brecht v. Abrahamson123 and Withrow .v. Wil-
liams.'24 In Brecht, the Court applied a substantial and injurious effect
test to the use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment
purposes. 2 ' The Court found it "entirely proper-and probative-for
the State to impeach" the criminal defendant's trial testimony with his
post-Miranda silence. 126 Following this reasoning, the Court held that
the use of the petitioner's post-Miranda silence did not prejudice the
defense.127 In his dissent, Justice White criticized the majority's adop-
122. Id. at 2209-10. See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the
state could show by a preponderance of evidence that a mentally ill person could validly waive
Miranda rights, and that the essence of a valid waiver is the absence of police coercion, in an
opinion joined by Justice White); Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (holding that the
use of psychiatric testimony about an interview held in the absence of counsel did not violate the
Fifth Amendment when used to rebut a mental disturbance defense, in an opinion joined by
Justice White). But see Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) (holding that the use of a
defendant's post-Miranda silence to prove his sanity violated his right to due process, in an
opinion joined by Justice White).
123. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). In Brecht, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief following his
conviction for murder. His claim was based on the use of his post-Miranda silence for
impeachment purposes. Id. at 1713-14. The petitioner argued that the Court's ruling in Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), entitled him to habeas corpus relief based on a violation of due
process. The Court rejected this position and adopted a standard requiring a showing that the error
had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. at 1714
(citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)).
124. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
125. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714. In reaching this decision, the Court classified the use of post-
Miranda silence as a trial error. Id. at 1717. The Court then contrasted the different standards of
review for collateral review and for direct review. Id. at 1720. With this in mind, the Court
adopted a "less onerous" standard for collateral review in cases of a Doyle violation. Id. at 1722.
The standard it adopted was the "substantial and injurious effect" test. Id. To meet this burden,
the habeas petitioner must establish that a trial error caused "actual prejudice" at his trial. Id. The
Court then found that the use of the petitioner's post-Miranda silence was harmless in light of the
other evidence presented at trial. Id.
126. Id. at 1716. The Court noted that it held in Doyle that the use of a defendant's silence for
impeachment purposes "violate[s] the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
1716 (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619). The rationale for this rule rests on principles of fairness and
the "implicit assurance" of the Miranda warnings. Id. As a result, the defendant's silence when
no warnings are given, or before they are given, is "probative and does not rest on any implied
assurance by law enforcement authorities that it will carry no penalty." Id. The Court found that
this case exemplified the concerns of Doyle and its progeny. Id.
Any violation of the protections granted under Doyle and its progeny was classified as a "trial
error" by the Court. The Court reasoned that the harm that occurred as a result of wrongfully
admitting evidence in violation of Doyle could be measured against the remaining evidence to
determine the intensity of its negative effect. The appropriate standard in such a case is whether
the "trial error" was "harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt." Id. at 1717.
127. Id. at 1722. To support this conclusion, the Court cited the infrequent use of the
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tion of divergent standards for direct and collateral review of constitu-
tional claims.' 28 He accused the Court of adopting a standard for
collateral review that renders most constitutional errors unreviewable.
t29
In his view, the Court transformed the area of habeas corpus into a "con-
fused patchwork."
' 130
In Withrow, five members of the Court, including Justice White,
rebuffed attempts to limit the use of habeas corpus in claims based on
Miranda.31  The Court rejected the notion that Miranda's status as a
prophylactic rule renders it unreviewable on petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.'32 In addition, the Court analyzed the rationale of Miranda and
the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to the states through
petitioner's silence, the permissible use of the petitioner's pre-Miranda silence, as well as the
autopsy report, all of which refuted the petitioner's story. Id. The Court also looked at evidence
of the petitioner's motive to commit the crime and the presence of a second bullet in the murder
weapon, which suggested to the Court that the weapon was not accidently discharged, as the
defense contended. Therefore, the Court concluded the use of the petitioner's post-Miranda
silence "did not 'substantially influence' the jury's verdict." Id.
128. Id. at 1725 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White characterized the majority's disposition
of the case as "illogical." Id. To support this proposition, he pointed out the error in allowing the
violation of a constitutional right simply because it appears on collateral review. Id. at 1726. He
also argued that claims based on a violation of the exclusionary rule were the only cases treated
with a different standard on habeas corpus, until this case. Id. (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976)). Justice White then discussed the adverse consequences of the Court's decision.
Since the Court has classified most constitutional errors as trial errors, use of the standard set forth
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), will now be drastically reduced. Id. at 1727. The
effect is that a state court's determination that a constitutional error was harmless is now
"unreviewable." Id. Thus, White stated that this result is "at odds with the role Congress has
ascribed to habeas review." Id.
129. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1728.
131. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993). In Withrow, the respondent was questioned
by two police officers about a double murder. Id. at 1748. The respondent at first denied any
knowledge of the crimes, but later began to reveal incriminating details. Id. The officers assured
the respondent that they were concerned only with the identity of the person who had actually
killed the victims. Id. After conferring, the officers decided to deliberately forego giving the
respondent his Miranda warnings. Id. When the respondent persisted in his denial of any
involvement, one of the officers threatened the respondent with incarceration. Id. The respondent
then made several incriminating statements, after which the officers informed him of his rights
under Miranda. Id. at 1749. The respondent waived those rights and made several more
incriminating statements. Id. The trial court suppressed two statements, but allowed the third
statement to be used at trial. After his conviction for murder, the respondent received habeas
corpus relief. Id. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. at 1756.
132. Id. at 1752. In reaching this decision, the Court examined the differences between the
rights protected by the exclusionary rule and Miranda. Id. at 1750-55. The Court noted that
Miranda protects a fundamental trial right. In addition, the Miranda rule serves to protect the trial
process from the use of unreliable statements. Id. at 1753. The Court also analogized Miranda's
protections to several other key constitutional issues that have retained their viability on collateral
review. For example, the Court likened Miranda to a due process claim of insufficient evidence;
an equal protection claim based on racial discrimination in jury selection; and a Sixth Amendment
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1750-51. As a result, the Court rejected the
19941
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:5 11
Malloy.133  The Court distinguished the rights protected by Miranda
from those protected by Mapp v. Ohio,134 by noting that the former safe-
guards "a fundamental trial right" while the exclusionary rule serves as a
deterrent to prevent constitutional violations.135  After acknowledging
that the privilege against self-incrimination "embodies 'principles of
humanity and civil liberty[,]' " the Court could find no significant bene-
fit in banning habeas corpus suits based on the Miranda decision.' 36 In
her opinion, dissenting in part and concurring in part, Justice O'Connor
could find no rationale to support the Court's decision.137 To bolster her
argument, she relied heavily on Justice White's earlier pronouncements
on Miranda. Referring to Justice White's statements that confessions
"aid in the pursuit of truth,"' 38 that confessions "when corroborated...
have the highest reliability," 39 and that the Miranda decision "estab-
lish[ed] a new .. .barrier to the ascertainment of truth,"'" Justice
O'Connor concluded that Justice White's former prediction that
petitioner's invitation to apply the limitations of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to
Miranda-based claims on collateral review. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1751.
133. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1752. The Court noted that Miranda's protections "countered" the
"inherent pressures" of police-dominated interrogation. Id.
134. 367 U.S. 643.(1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to bar the trial use of evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment in state prosecutions).
135. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753. Furthermore, the Court responded to the petitioner's
argument that the Miranda protections fall under the Stone rationale because they are only
"prophylactic" in nature. Id. The difference between Miranda's protections and those found in
Mapp lies in the nature of the rights protected by the cases. The Court explained that "the Mapp
rule 'is not a personal constitutional right,' but serves to deter future constitutional violations." Id.
(quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 486). On the other hand, Miranda protects "a fundamental trial right."
Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)). Moreover, this right
"embodies 'principles of humanity and civil liberty, which had been secured in the mother country
only after years of struggle.' " Id. at 1753 (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544
(1897)).
136. Id. at 1753 (quoting Brain, 168 U.S. at 544). The Court noted that barring Miranda
claims from collateral review would not significantly advance the goals of federalism. Id. at 1754.
In fact, the Court reasoned that any bar to Miranda based errors would transform these cases into
due process cases. Id. In addition, the law-enforcement apparatus has grown to accept Miranda.
Therefore, there is no reason for the eradication of Miranda from the area of habeas corpus. Id. at
1755.
137. Id. at 1756 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). In her answer to the majority opinion, Justice
O'Connor pointed out the effect that collateral review has on finality. Id. She also noted the
concerns of equity and federalism that accompany habeas corpus. Id. at 1757. Furthermore, she
advocated restraint in the area of habeas corpus.
Justice O'Connor then analogized the lack of deterrent effect in Miranda cases on collateral
review to search and seizure cases. Relying on the notion that the Miranda rules encompass more
than the Constitution requires, she advocated a limit on its use on collateral review. Id. at 1759-
60. Finally, Justice O'Connor rejected the rationale offered by the majority to maintain the status
quo in regard to Miranda. Id. at 1760-65.
138. Id. at 1759 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 461 (1974) (White, J., concurring)).
139. Id. at 1759 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 538 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)).
140. Id. at 1762 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542
(1966) (White, J., dissenting)).
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Miranda would ask more questions than it answered has been proven by
experience. 14 ' The irony of Justice O'Connor's use of Justice White's
dissent in Miranda is that he himself no longer subscribed to that posi-
tion. With the reasoning set forth in these later opinions, Justice White's
early opposition to Miranda had been completely reversed.
Justice White made a complete break with his earlier opposition to
the privilege against self-incrimination as a means of insuring the inter-
ests of the accused during police interrogation. The transformation was
dramatic. From the dissent in Miranda and the opinions that followed
up to Innis, Justice White demonstrated an unwavering zeal to eradicate
the Miranda doctrine. Yet, in Edwards, he not only accepted Miranda,
but enshrined its protections through a per se rule which he created. His
opposition to Miranda vanished completely in Brecht. 42 This metamor-
phosis, however, arrived with a stiff cost-the restriction of the right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
III. JUSTICE WHITE AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The barrier to police interrogation erected by the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has lost much of its vitality because of its juxtaposition
with the Miranda doctrine. A key player in this evisceration of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was Justice White. 4 3 This section of the
Article traces Justice White's hostility to the right to counsel in the con-
text of interrogation from his initial disdain shown in the Massiah and
Escobedo cases to the realization of his more receptive position in Pat-
terson v. Illinois."'
In Massiah v. United States,4 ' the Court examined the petitioner's
141. Id. at 1764 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 544-45 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting)). But see Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, The Attorney General, and the
Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 733, 737 (1987) (noting that the police,
after initial resistance to the Miranda decision, have accepted its directives, while the Supreme
Court continues to try to undermine it).
142. See also New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990) (clarifying that confessions must be
free of coercion and in accordance with Miranda and Edwards, in dicta).
143. For an analysis of the weaknesses of the initial jurisprudence in this area, see infra notes
255-337 and accompanying text.
144. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
145. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the petitioner was indicted for violating narcotic laws.
After retaining a lawyer and pleading not guilty, he was released on bail. Id. at 202. At that time,
a codefendant, in cooperation with federal narcotics agents, elicited several incriminating
statements from the petitioner. Id. at 202-03. This conversation was overheard by a federal agent
via a radio transmitter, and the incriminating statements were admitted at the petitioner's trial.
The petitioner was convicted of several offenses, and these convictions were subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 203.
The Supreme Court reversed these convictions based on the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 205-
06. The Court held that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the
agents' tactics in obtaining the incriminating statements. See also McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356
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claim that the government violated his Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel. 146 The Court found that the petitioner had been denied the assist-
ance of counsel when governmental agents "deliberately elicited"
incriminating statements from him in the absence of his attorney.' 47 The
Court found that the occurrence of the conversation after an indictment
and outside the presence of the accused's attorney violated the peti-
tioner's right to counsel. 48  The Court explained the importance of
counsel at this stage by quoting the seminal case of Powell v. Ala-
bama,149 as follows:
during perhaps the most critical of the proceedings... that is to say,
from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial,
when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are]
vitally important, the defendants ... [are] as much entitled to such
aid [of counsel] during that period as at the trial itself.'5
In his dissent, Justice White vociferously disagreed with the
Court.' 5 ' He first characterized the decision to suppress the incriminat-
ing statements as "barring the use of evidence which is relevant, reliable
and highly probative."' 52 He argued that such extreme suppression
measures are warranted to serve "other policies of overriding impor-
tance."' 53 Here, however, no such justification existed.'5 4 Justice White
(1965) (applying Massiah to the states); James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the
Right to Counsel Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1 (1988) (providing an analysis of the rationale and implications of Massiah).
146. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206-07.
147. Id. at 206. To reach its decision, the Court relied on the concurring opinions in Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326, 327 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Stewart, J., concurring). In
Massiah, the Court noted that the concurrences in Spano emphasized a defendant's need for an
attorney at the trial level to safeguard his due process interest. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 327
(Stewart, J., concurring). In addition, the Court also relied on Spano for the proposition that the
defendant must be afforded an attorney at post-indictment interrogation to provide effective legal
assistance "at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him." See Massiah, 377 U.S.
at 204 (quoting Spano, 360 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring)). The Court then pointed to
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932), to emphasize the important role counsel plays in the
period between arraignment and trial in preparing for trial. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205. The Court
also adopted the language of a dissenting judge in the lower court to point out that the use of
surreptitious, rather than obvious interrogators, had no bearing on the constitutionality of the
government's methods. Id. at 206. If anything, the use of the undercover agent "more seriously
imposed upon" the petitioner's right to counsel because of its secrecy. Id. Finally, the Court
allowed the continued use of secret investigations after indictment, but barred the government
from using any statements made concerning the indicted offense. Id. at 207.
148. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207.
149. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
150. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
151. Id. at 207 (White, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 208.
153. Id. Justice White noted that the search for truth is impeded without this evidence. Id. He
also observed, however, that the ultimate result of releasing a guilty defendant is justified when
doing so reflects a sound policy. Id. He called attention to the fact that the Court had previously
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went on to explain that the government did not interfere with Massiah's
right to counsel as it has been previously defined as merely a trial
right.155 He observed that the government did not interfere here with
attorney-client conferences, spy on these meetings, or obstruct counsel's
preparation for trial. 56
Justice White then portrayed the Court's decision as a "thinly dis-
guised constitutional policy of minimizing or entirely prohibiting the use
... of voluntary out-of-court admissions and confessions made by the
accused." '57  The voluntary nature of the statements in Massiah
prompted him to characterize the Court's new rule as excessive and
unwarranted by the Fifth Amendment.1 58 He also suggested that Mas-
siah's majority position was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination while masquerading as a Sixth Amendment
decision. 59 The protections contained in the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel pro-
vision, Justice White argued, were designed to benefit the accused's trial
rights, not to act as a barrier to the pre-trial interrogation process. 6° In
his view, the admissibility of pre-trial statements should be governed by
the voluntariness-due process test of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 1
61
erected such sweeping measures to safeguard the protections of the Fourth Amendment in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Massiah, 377
U.S. at 208. Justice White reasoned that such exclusions of evidence must be based on solid
constitutional footing, and that the requisite foundation was lacking in the majority's decision.
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208 (White, J., dissenting).
154. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also noted that the Court's
rationale would apply to statements made after an unindicted suspect has asked for a lawyer, to
"the fruits of admissions improperly obtained under the new rule," to state court cases, and to
habeas corpus cases. Id. at 208-09. To Justice White, the potential for widespread effect
underscored the need for "solid foundations," which the decision lacked. Id. at 208.
155. Id. at 209. Justice White also noted that the basis for this new definition of the right to
counsel merits further elaboration which the Court failed to supply. Id. at 209. He predicted a
"severe and unfortunate impact upon the great bulk of criminal cases" if the Court followed its
rationale to its logical conclusion. Id.
156. Id. at 209. Justice White characterized the majority's rationale as "a sterile syllogism...
[and] an unsound one, besides." Id. He relied on Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), to show that the Court had expanded the definition of the
attorney-client relationship without explanation. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 209 (White, J., dissenting).
157. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 209 (White, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. He stated that the key inquiry in this area was to determine whether the confession
was coerced. See id. at 209-10.
160. Id. at 210. Justice White noted that the underlying concern of these protections is
coercion. In the absence of coercion, pre-trial statements should be admitted. Id.
161. Id. Justice White saw the Court's departure from the voluntariness test as unjustified. He
stated: "[tihe Court presents no fact, no objective evidence, no reasons to warrant scrapping the
voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility in this area. Without such evidence I would retain it in
its present form." Id.
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In concluding his dissent, Justice White reaffirmed the need for
rules that prevent the use of coercive tactics, but recognized that "here
there was no substitution of brutality for brains."' 62 He further stated
that the voluntariness test would provide ample protection to criminal
defendants.' 63  Under that standard, interrogation in the absence of an
attorney would not be the sole dispositive concern but only one factor in
determining the voluntariness of a confession. 164 Therefore, Justice
White based his opposition to Massiah on his preference for the volunta-
riness test and the decision's potential for impeding law enforcement.
In Escobedo v. Illinoist65 the Court expanded the Massiah rule to
bar incriminating statements made after a criminal investigation shifted
its "focus [to] a particular suspect," during a custodial interrogation in
the absence of counsel. 166 Here, the Court extended the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to a pre-indictment stage, which it found to be a
critical stage. 167  Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, saw this
type of interrogation as an adversarial evidence gathering proceeding
that denuded the subsequent trial.' 68  The Court also emphasized the
162. Id. at 213. Justice White was also quick to point out that "[liaw enforcement may have
the elements of a contest about it, but it is not a game." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Justice White reasoned that the new rule would prevent the finder of fact from
utilizing reliable evidence and would hinder the search for truth. Id. But see James J. Tomkovicz,
The Truth About Massiah, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 641 (1990). In his article, Professor Tomkovicz
addresses the contention expressed by the United States Department of Justice that the Massiah
decision obstructs truth in criminal justice. See id.; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 3, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE Massiah Line of Cases,
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 661, 706 (1989). Professor Tomkovicz concluded that the
values expressed in Massiah, notably fair-play, reflect the "core of the Sixth Amendment."
Tomkovicz, supra, at 683. As a result, the decision in Massiah is both "constitutionally legitimate
and necessary." Id. Indeed, he espouses the view that while Massiah may hinder "truth in
criminal justice," it safeguards the "truth in constitutional law" by protecting the constitutional
rights of the accused. Id. at 644.
165. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the petitioner refused to make any statements to the
police after his arrest and expressed a desire to talk with his attorney. Id. at 479. His attorney
arrived at the police station during the interrogation and requested access to his client. Id. at 480.
The police repeatedly denied the petitioner all contact with his attorney. Id. at 479-84. When the
police confronted Escobedo with another suspect, he made statements admitting involvement in
the murder. Id. at 483. These statements were admitted into evidence over objection, and
Escobedo was convicted of murder. Id. at 483-84. The conviction was eventually affirmed by the
Illinois Supreme Court. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Id. at 491. The Court held that the petitioner was denied his right to counsel at a "critical" stage of
the proceedings. Id. at 486. The Court extended the right to counsel established in Massiah to
encompass the time when a criminal investigation ceases to be a general investigation, and
"focus[es] on a particular suspect." Id. at 490.
166. Id. at 490-91.
167. Id. at 486.
168. Id. at 488. The Court also devoted considerable attention to the folly of relying on a
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importance of the attorney during these interrogations.' 69 Relying on
Massiah, the Court reiterated the decisive influence an attorney's legal
advice has at this stage of an investigation.' 70 The Court also referred to
Gideon v. Wainwright,171 for the proposition that a criminal defendant is
entitled to have legal representation at trial.' 72  With that in mind, the
Court reasoned that the state's argument that the police should be
allowed to interrogate the accused without his attorney present would
make the trial "an appeal from the interrogation," rather than a meaning-
ful determination of guilt or innocence.
1 73
In response to the majority's position in Escobedo, Justice White
speculated that the Court's ultimate goal was to bar all statements made
by a suspect "whether involuntar[y] . . . or not."' 74 He further posited
that the rationale behind this goal was the majority's view "that it is
uncivilized law enforcement to use an accused's own admissions against
him at his trial."'175 Justice White characterized the abandonment of the
voluntariness test in favor of the new rule based on the Sixth Amend-
ment as "nebulous."' 176 He also emphasized that the Sixth Amendment
was designed to protect a defendant at "proceedings in which definable
confession for convictions. Id. at 488-90. The Court, citing Dean Wigmore, noted the superiority
of "skillful investigation," as well as the potential for abusing the interrogation process. Id. at
489, 490. In addition, the Court observed that the defendant's use of an attorney at an
interrogation is not something a free society should fear. Id. at 490.
169. Id. at 488. The Court reasoned that the right to an attorney would be practically
meaningless if it "began at a period when few confessions were obtained." Id. The Court noted
that this stage is important to the police because of their investigation and to the accused because
of his "need for legal advice." Id. As the Court recognized, however, the "Constitution ... strikes
the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against
self-incrimination." Id.
170. Id. at 488. The Court reasoned that the "fact that many confessions are obtained during
this period points up its critical nature as a 'stage when legal aid and advice' are surely needed."
Id. at 488.
171. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
172. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 487.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 495 (White, J., dissenting). See also Caplan, supra note 14, at 1443. In his article,
Professor Caplan agreed with Justice White's characterization of the Escobedo decision as the first
step towards barring all custodial confessions. He also noted that the Escobedo decision, while
giving the criminal defendant a "sporting" chance, denied that same fairness to the government by
providing the accused with an attorney. Id. at 1443. It should be noted, however, that the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clauses protect the accused, not
the government. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, V. In addition, the Sixth Amendment speaks only of
providing the accused with an attorney. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
175. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 496.
176. Id. Justice White was critical of the Court for erecting an "impenetrable barrier" to
interrogation by means of the right to counsel. Id. at 496. He explained that the new rule would
be unworkable absent absurd modifications to the present system, such as equipping every police
car with a public defender. Id. Justice White also characterized the new principle as "amorphous
and wholly unworkable" in comparison to the former standards. Id.
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rights can be won or lost, not [at] stages where probative evidence might
be obtained." '177 In other words, for Justice White, the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel is a trial right only.
Alternatively, he opposed using the Sixth Amendment as a device
to safeguard the rights of the accused during police interrogation,
because they are already guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination clause.17 8 Justice White further argued that the majority
created new protections that surpassed the requirements of the Constitu-
tion. 79 Finally, Justice White once again advocated the position that the
absence of an attorney during interrogation should be nothing more than
a factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession and not the sole
point of inquiry.' 80
Escobedo's rationale was obliterated in Moran v. Burbine."'8 Jus-
tice White joined the opinion written by Justice O'Connor which gave
little weight to the fact that the investigation had focused on the respon-
dent. Instead, the Court found the absence of an indictment more com-
pelling.' 82 The Court further noted that Escobedo, although originally
decided on Sixth Amendment grounds, actually protected Fifth Amend-
ment interests'8 3 and "provides no support for respondent's argu-
177. Id. at 497. Justice White further argued that the majority's rationale, when taken to its
fullest and most absurd lengths, would require the presence of attorneys when crimes are
committed because that is when "crucial incriminating evidence is put within the reach of the
Government." Id.
178. Id. at 497. In outlining this opposition, Justice White stated:
[i]t is incongruous to assume that the provision for counsel in the Sixth Amendment
was meant to amend or supersede the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth
Amendment, which is now applicable to the States. That amendment addresses
itself to the very issue of incriminating admissions of an accused and resolves it by
proscribing only compelled statements. Neither the Framers, the constitutional
language, a century of decisions of this Court nor Professor Wigmore provides an
iota of support for the idea that an accused has an absolute constitutional right not to
answer even in the absence of compulsion-the constitutional right not to
incriminate himself by making voluntary disclosures.
Id. (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 498. Justice White stated that "[tihe only 'inquisitions' the Constitution forbids are
those which compel incrimination." Id. He pointed out that the Court did not find that
Escobedo's statements fell under this proscription. Id.
180. Id. at 499. Justice White stated that the use of a confession was unlikely when the suspect
was ignorant of his rights. He also stated that Escobedo was in fact aware of his right to remain
mute. Id. The dissent concluded with Justice White's pronouncement that the Escobedo decision
would not destroy law enforcement, but cripple it for "unsound, unstated reasons" without support
in the Constitution. Id. See also id. at 492 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the decision as
"ill-conceived" and an illegitimate bar to effective law enforcement); id. at 493 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that Massiah and the Sixth Amendment are irrelevant in this case).
181. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
182. Id. at 428.
183. Id. at 429 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
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ment."' 84 The opinion continued with the Court's analysis of the right
to counsel. The Court derided the notion that the Sixth Amendment is
designed "to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relation-
ship for its own sake."' 85 Instead it is designed to shield the individual,
after formal accusation, from the more knowledgeable and skilled forces
of the prosecution.'
86
The Court revisited the Massiah doctrine and further clarified the
role of the Sixth Amendment in Brewer v. Williams."7 In Brewer, the
Court focused on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and a suspect's
entitlement to the assistance of an attorney after formal judicial proceed-
ings had begun.188 This right, the Court stated, "is indispensable to the
184. Id. at 430.
185. Id. at 430.
186. Id. The Court also relied on Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), for the proposition
that the indictment is "fundamental to the proper application of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." Moran, 475 U.S. at 431. The Court undermined Escobedo when it stated that "the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of formal charges." Id.
at 431. See also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding, in an opinion penned by
Justice White, that incriminating statements made by a probationer to a probation officer during a
mandatory meeting were admissible, and that the meeting was not custodial for Miranda
purposes).
187. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer, the respondent surrendered to the police in Davenport,
Iowa, in response to an arrest warrant for abduction that was issued for him in Des Moines, Iowa.
Id. at 390. The respondent then spoke with his lawyer in Des Moines. The attorney told the
respondent that the Des Moines police would be transporting him to Des Moines. Id. In addition,
the lawyer told the respondent that he should not discuss the case with the police. In Davenport,
the respondent was arraigned and advised of his Miranda rights. While in the courtroom, the
respondent spoke with a local attorney who told the respondent not to talk to the police until after
he consulted with his Des Moines attorney. When the Des Moines detectives arrived, they
consulted with the local attorney and, after some hesitation, agreed not to interrogate the
respondent on the trip to Des Moines. Id. at 391-92. In the car, the respondent told the two
detectives that he would tell "the whole story" after he consulted with his attorney in Des Moines.
Id. at 392. One of the detectives then made what has come to be known as "the Christian burial
speech." Id. The detective knew that the respondent was deeply religious, and played on this
characteristic in a speech that reminded the respondent of the ensuing blizzard and the fact that the
victim was kidnapped and murdered on Christmas Eve. Id. at 392-93. Sometime after the speech,
the respondent asked questions about the ongoing search for clues, and then led the police to the
victim's body. Id. at 393. Before the respondent's trial, his attorney moved to suppress the
evidence gained as a result of the detective's speech. The trial court found that the evidence was
gathered at a "critical stage" when the respondent had a right to counsel, but that this right had
been waived. Id. at 394. The respondent was convicted of murder, and the conviction was
affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court. Id. The respondent then received habeas corpus relief from
the federal court which found that the state violated the respondent's right to counsel, violated his
Fifth Amendment rights as defined in Miranda and Escobedo, and involuntarily obtained the
respondent's statements. Id. at 395. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the first two grounds, but
did not address voluntariness. Id. at 397 n.5. The Supreme Court affirmed the granting of habeas
corpus relief, Id. at 406.
188. Id. at 397-98. In deciding the case in the respondent's favor on the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the Court did not see the need to discuss the involuntary nature of the statements
or Miranda concerns. Id.
19941
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fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice."' 89
Thus, the Court validated Massiah, and then proceeded to define the
right.190 The Court stated that the initiation of formal adversarial judi-
cial proceedings against a suspect, an arraignment for example, triggers
the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.19' Because
Williams had been arraigned, the Court concluded that the police had
deliberately elicited incriminating statements from the respondent after
this right had attached. 92
The Court also found that the respondent did not waive his right to
be interrogated only in the presence of counsel.' 93 Analyzing the waiver
question under the "knowing and intelligent waiver" standard of John-
son v. Zerbst,194 the Court found that the respondent's expressly stated
desire to deal with the police only through his attorney belied any notion
that he validly waived his right to counsel.' 95 The Court stated that
"waiver requires not merely comprehension but relinquishment, and
Williams' consistent reliance upon the advice of counsel in dealing with
the authorities refutes any suggestion that he waived [the right to
counsel]." 196
In his dissent, Justice White did not attack Massiah, but instead
concentrated on the issue of waiver. 97 Justice White explained that the
circumstances of the case supported his conclusion that the respondent
189. Id. at 398. The Court then cited Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), to emphasize the
"vital need" for an attorney at the pre-trial stage. Id.
190. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398. The Court noted that jurisprudence in this area had become
somewhat murky, but that the overriding concerns remained clear. In both state and federal
contexts, the defendant is entitled to a lawyer's assistance when facing the forces of the
prosecution. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 399. The Court began by stating that "[tihere can be no doubt in the present case
that judicial proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the start of the automobile
ride from Davenport to Des Moines." Id. The arrest warrant, the arraignment, and the jailing of
the respondent were all critical factors in this determination. In addition, the Court found that the
detective had "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information" when he made the
Christian burial speech. Id. at 399-400. The Court found the case indistinguishable from
Massiah. Id. at 400.
193. Id. at 401. The Court began its discussion of waiver by noting that the nature of waiver is
one of constitutional law, and not fact. Id. at 403.
194. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
195. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404-05. The Court focused on the respondent's repeated statements
to speak with the police only through his attorneys. In addition, the Court noted that the detective
was aware of the respondent's desire to speak only through his attorney, yet he proceeded to elicit
incriminating statements from the respondent. Id. The detective's failure to warn the respondent
of his constitutional right to a lawyer, as well as the failure to secure a waiver, were significant
factors in the Court's decision. As the Court stated, "[t]he circumstances ... in this case thus
provide no reasonable basis for finding that Williams waived his right to assistance of counsel."
Id. at 405.
196. Id. at 404.
197. Id. at 430 (White, J., dissenting).
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had validly waived his right to counsel.' 98 Specifically, Justice White
focused on the respondent's knowledge of his right to remain silent, the
length of time between the detective's statements and the respondent's
statements, and the lack of coercion.'99 In addition, Justice White
argued that the waiver requirements in Miranda and its progeny would
have been met on the facts of this case.2°° Therefore, he reasoned, the
majority was needlessly increasing the requirements for waiver in this
case and allowing a guilty man to go free.2 10
In United States v. Henry,20 2 Justice White also dissented from the
198. Id. at 431.
199. Id. at 431-33. Justice White observed that the respondent had received five separate
Miranda warnings. Id. at 431. In addition, Justice White noted that the respondent discussed
several topics that the speech did not cover, such as the location of the victim's clothing. Id. at
433. But see Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is
"Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, reprinted in KAmISAR EsSAYS, supra note 14, at 147-50.
In this article, Professor Kainsar attacks the basic premises of Justice White's dissent. He points
out the similarity between the police officer's technique and the methods described in common
interrogation manuals. Id. at 148 n.16.
200. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 435 n.5. Justice White also pointed to the respondent's numerous
consultations with his attorneys. Id. at 434. These discussions served to unequivocally inform the
respondent of his right to remain silent. Therefore, Justice White reasoned that the waiver was
knowing and intelligent. Id. at 435. He concluded that a waiver is proper whenever the facts
demonstrate that the suspect knew of his rights and relinquished them. Id.
201. Id. at 437-38. Justice White's prediction of injustice did not hold true. The respondent
was retried, convicted, and again granted habeas corpus relief. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
437-39 (1984). This time, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief. Id. at
440. In its decision, the Court adopted the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary
rule, set the burden of proof for this exception at the preponderance of evidence level, refused to
employ a requirement of good faith, and allowed this exception to be used in Sixth Amendment
violations. Id. at 440-48. The Court then found, under the facts of this case, that the victim's
body and the other evidence would have been inevitably discovered by the search party. Id. at
448-50. In his concurring opinion, Justice White commended the detective who initially made the
Christian burial speech. Id. at 450-51 (White, J., concurring). Justice White noted that the
"intricacies" of Miranda might readily confuse the layman police officer, as it had closely divided
the Court. He concluded his concurrence by stating:
[Officer Learning] was no doubt acting as many competent police officers would
have acted under similar circumstances and in light of the then-existing law. That
five Justices later thought he was mistaken does not call for making him out to be a
villain or for a lecture on deliberate police misconduct and its resulting costs to
society.
Id. at 451.
202. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). In Henry, the respondent was indicted for bank robbery and placed
in jail to await trial. Id. at 265-66. In the same jail cell as the respondent was another prisoner, a
paid F.B.I. informant, who had been instructed to "be alert" for any incriminating statements, but
not to initiate any conversations about the bank robbery. Id. at 266. The respondent made several
incriminating statements to the informant. The informant told the F.B.I. agents of these
statements, and was paid for providing the information. Id. at 266. At the respondent's trial, the
informant testified about the statements, and the respondent was convicted. Id. at 267. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction based on a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 274-
75.
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majority opinion.20 3 The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice
Burger, held that the government violated the respondent's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by arranging for a paid informant to listen
for incriminating statements in a jail cell.204 The Court found that the
government's actions were a deliberate attempt to elicit incriminating
statements from the respondent in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
20 5
Specifically, the Court rejected the government's attempt to circumvent
the Sixth Amendment by focusing on the voluntary nature of the state-
ments.20 6 In finding a breach under the Sixth Amendment, Chief Justice
Burger relied on three factors: 1) the informant was in the paid employ
of the government; 2) the informant pretended to be just another pris-
oner; and 3) the respondent was under indictment and was in custody
when he made the statements. 07
Justice White joined the dissent written by Justice Blackmun.
20 8
The dissenters stated that the Court overstepped Massiah, the Sixth
Amendment, and sound policy in its decision. 21 Justice Blackmun rea-
soned that the Court twisted the meaning of "deliberately elicited" by
applying it to the facts of this case.21 In addition, he chastised the Court
for extending Sixth Amendment protections to the "passive" measures
used by the government in this case. 21' Furthermore, Justice Blackmun
could find no overriding policy concerns to justify the Court's
203. Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
205. Id. at 274-75. But see Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (finding that
incriminating statements made to a jailhouse informant who was placed in close proximity to
respondent with orders to listen, but not to initiate conversations, were admissible).
206. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273.
207. Id. at 270. The Court characterized conversations with known government agents as
"arm's length" encounters. Id. at 273. In contrast, conversations with undercover agents may
cause the suspect to unintentionally reveal information to his adversary, the government. This
"surreptitious" elicitation is precisely what Massiah was designed to protect against. Id. In
addition, without actual knowledge of the informant's true colors, a constitutionally valid waiver
is impossible. Id. The Court also noted that "the powerful psychological inducements to reach for
aid when a person is in confinement" could not be overlooked. Id. at 274. These factors, the
Court found, were critical to the respondent's trust in the informant. Id.
208. Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justice White joined
Justice Blackmun's dissent rather than Justice Rehnquist's. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist
called for a re-examination of Massiah and relied on Justice White's dissent in that opinion. Id. at
289, 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 279. After analyzing the facts of the case, specifically, the agent's warning to the
informant that he not initiate any conversations, Justice Blackmun found the Court's ruling
implausible. He postulated that the Court's reasoning would allow Massiah's protections to bar
incriminating statements that are obtained as a result of accidental or coincidental events. Id.
211. Id. at 280. Justice Blackmun could find no support for this extension of precedent. He
noted that the basis for the Sixth Amendment protection embodied in Massiah was the deliberate
attempts to gather information. Id. at 279-80. In contrast, this case exemplified passive methods
of information gathering. Id. at 280.
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decision.212
In Maine v. Moulton2 13 the Court again relied on the Sixth Amend-
ment, finding incriminating statements made to a co-indictee turned
informant inadmissible.2 14 The Court reasoned that the state had "know-
ingly circumvent[ed]" the petitioner's right to counsel by arranging for
his codefendant to tape record post-indictment conversations.
21 5
Justice White dissented from this ruling and joined an opinion writ-
ten by Chief Justice Burger.216 The dissent focused on several facts in
the case that the majority "glosse[d] over. 21 7 After outlining the threats
and criminal plans that the respondent had made in the recorded conver-
sations,2 18 the dissent noted the offense specific nature of the Sixth
Amendment's protections. 2 9 The critical factor to the dissent's reason-
ing was that the incriminating statements concerning the indicted offense
212. Id. at 280. Justice Blackmun gave several reasons. First, he stated that the decision
would "significantly broaden [the] Sixth Amendment exclusion[ary rule]." Id. Second, the Court
ignored the necessity of undercover work. Id. at 280-81. Third, the Court disregarded the fact
that the statements were voluntarily made. Id. at 281. Fourth, the Court "condemn[ed]" faultless
police tactics. Id. Fifth, the Court relied on considerations of fairness when there was no planned
attempts to deceive here. Id. Finally, the Court extended Massiah without a valid justification for
doing so. Id. at 281-82.
In addition, Justice Blackmun examined the basis for the majority's opinion, and found it
wanting. Id. at 282. He stated that the Court's finding that the informant was paid on a
contingent-fee arrangement was unsupported by the record. Id. at 283. He also noted that the
majority retreated from its holding in Brewer that the surreptitious nature of an interrogator was
irrelevant. Finally, he noted that the Court's concern with the inherently coercive nature of a jail
cell was misplaced because of the informant's status as a prisoner. Id. at 284-85.
213. 474 U.S. 159 (1985). In Moulton, the respondent made incriminating statements to a
codefendant after he was indicted. Id. at 162-66. The codefendant had arranged with the police to
record his telephone calls and wear a tape recorder in order to capture the statements. Id. at 163,
164. The stated reason for recording the statements was to investigate crimes for which the
respondent had not been indicted. See id. at 166-67. Nonetheless, the respondent made
incriminating statements concerning the for which charges he was indicted. Id. at 165-66. The
statements were used at the respondent's trial over his objection. Id. at 166. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine reversed the trial court's decision. Id. at 168. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision and held that the incriminating statements were inadmissible. Id. at 168.
214. Id. at 180.
215. Id. at 176. The Court rejected the state's attempts to distinguish the case from Massiah
and Henry. The state pointed to the fact that the conversations were initiated by the respondent;
however, the Court found this irrelevant. Id. at 174-75. In addition, the Court rejected the state's
attempts to justify the recordings as integral to a separate investigation. Id. at 178-80.
216. Id. at 181 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 181.
218. Id. at 181-84. The Chief Justice pointed out that the codefendant had approached the
police after receiving threatening phone calls. Id. at 181. The dissent also noted that several
witnesses had been threatened either anonymously or by the respondent himself. Id. at 182. In
addition, the dissent referred to the fact that several incriminating statements concerned charges
for which the respondent was not indicted. Id. at 183.
219. Id. at 185. In his dissent, the Chief Justice relied on Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966), which also involved the recording of incriminating statements after an indictment, relating
to separate offenses. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 185.
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were made during an investigation of unindicted offenses.22° Therefore,
the Massiah concerns with "deliberate elicitation" were not endangered,
as the police sought to gather evidence for unindicted crimes. 22' The
statements concerning the indicted crimes were merely incidental to the
other investigation.222 Finally, the dissent faulted the Court for applying
its new rule in this case because it served to deter police behavior that
was not designed to deprive the respondent of a crucial constitutional
right, but was, in fact, commendable. 223  The dissent noted that the
respondent did not have the right to an attorney's assistance in planning
future crimes, and that the police officers' "careful actions" avoided any
hint of impropriety.224 As a result, the dissent viewed the majority's




In Michigan v. Jackson,22 6 Justice White temporarily abandoned his
Sixth Amendment criticism when he joined the majority in upholding
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in an interrogation setting. The
Court in Jackson held that confessions obtained during police initiated
interrogation after the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel must be suppressed.2 2 7 In the course of its opinion, the Court held
220. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 185. The Chief Justice stated:
the State engaged in no impermissible conduct in its investigation of respondent
based on [the informant's] revelations. By recording conversations between
respondent and [the informant, the police] succeeded in obtaining evidence that the
Court's opinion concedes could have been used to convict respondent of further
crimes. In fact this record shows clearly that, based on the recordings, the State was
able to obtain additional indictments against respondent for burglary, arson, and
three more thefts.
Id. at 185-86.
221. Id. at 186-87.
222. Id. The Chief Justice saw the extension of Massiah to the facts in this case as a departure
from precedent. Id. at 187 n.3. The statements were not obtained as a result of a "deliberate
circumvention" of counsel. Id. at 188. Therefore, Massiah was not applicable. See id. at 189.
But see Tomkovicz, supra note 145, at 83-89. Professor Tomkovicz discussed the exception
proposed by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent and concluded that the Court correctly rejected the
invitation. Id. at 88. He further argued that the "good faith" exception is "rooted in 'ends justify
means' reasoning." Id.
223. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 192.
224. Id. at 188, 189.
225. Id. at 190.
226. 475 U.S. 625 (1986). Jackson arose from the consolidation of two separate murder cases.
Both respondents requested counsel at their arraignment. Counsel was appointed for each, but
neither consulted with counsel before his interrogation. Id. at 626. Both respondents were
informed of their Miranda rights by the police prior to interrogation. They made incriminating
statements in response to the police initiated interrogation, and all of these statements were
received into evidence, resulting in the respondents' convictions, Id. at 627. The Michigan
Supreme Court reversed these convictions. Id. at 627-29. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 629.
227. Id. at 628-29.
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that the right to counsel attaches at the stage of formal accusation, 28 and
that while this right does not turn on whether the accused retains or
requests the appointment of counsel, 2 9 the request for counsel is "an
extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent
waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation. 23 ° Consequently,
the Court applied Justice White's Fifth Amendment reasoning in
Edwards to a Sixth Amendment context and held that any subsequent
waiver is invalid.23' The Court found that, although differences exist in
the legal principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the sus-
pect's right to counsel at a post-arraignment interrogation merits as
much protection as the right to have counsel present at a pre-indictment
"custodial" interrogation.2 32 Although Justice White did not write a sep-
arate opinion in Jackson, his vote with the majority is consistent with the
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence which he developed in Edwards.233
Justice White's embrace of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was short lived, however. In Patterson v. Illinois, 23 4 Justice White, writ-
ing for the majority, held that the police may initiate a post-indictment
interrogation of the accused if the accused had not previously requested
228. Id. at 629. The Court noted that the "arraignment signals 'the initiation of adversary
judicial proceedings' and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment; thereafter, government
efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent 'critical stages' at
which the Sixth Amendment applies." Id. at 629-30 (citations omitted). In making this statement,
the Court reaffirmed the principles established in Massiah, Brewer, Henry, and Moulton. See id.
at 630.
229. Id. at 633 n.6. The Court rejected the state's argument that the request for counsel at
arraignment only encompasses a desire to be represented by counsel at formal proceedings. Id. at
632-33. The Court found such distinctions to be beyond the ken of the average person. Id. at 633
n.7. The Court also found the state's argument that the police may be ignorant of the request to be
"unavailing," and in the context of the case "unconvincing." Id. at 634. The Court then found the
waivers to be "insufficient" in light of its decision in Edwards. Id. at 635.
230. Id. at 633 n.6.
231. Id. at 636. But see Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) (holding, in an opinion
joined by Justice White, that a confession taken in violation of Jackson could be used to impeach
the defendant's testimony); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
232. Id. at 632.
233. See infra notes 255-337 and accompanying text for further analysis.
234. 487 U.S. 285 (1988). In Patterson, the petitioner and several other gang members
participated in two fights with a rival gang. A murder resulted from the second confrontation. In
connection with the first fight, the police arrested a gang member who implicated the petitioner in
the second fight and murder. Id. at 287. The police arrested the petitioner and gave him the
Miranda warnings. The petitioner then gave statements about the first fight, but denied any
knowledge of the murder. Id. at 287-88. The petitioner was then indicted for the murder. While
the petitioner was being transferred to a county jail, he made an incriminating statement. Id. at
288. One of the police officers gave the petitioner a Miranda waiver form, which he signed. Id.
The petitioner then made a confession to several police officers and an assistant state's attorney.
At trial, the petitioner tried unsuccessfully to suppress his statements. Id. at 289. He was found
guilty of murder, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 287-90. The Supreme Court
subsequently affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to allow the use of the confessions at
trial. Id. at 300.
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the appointment of counsel or retained counsel and made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.235 Justice White rebuffed the
petitioner's first argument that a police-initiated interrogation was
"barred" by his status as an indictee.236 In rejecting this contention, he
distinguished the case from the facts in Jackson.2 37 He noted that the
petitioner never tried to exercise his right to counsel, while Jackson
"turned on the fact that the accused 'ha[d] asked for the help of a law-
yer' in dealing with the police. 238 He then stated, "[ijf an accused
'knowingly and intelligently' pursues the latter course [of facing ques-
tioning without counsel], we see no reason why the uncounseled state-
ments he then makes must be excluded at his trial."
' 2 3 9
Justice White then addressed the "more substantial claim," the
validity of the petitioner's waiver.240 First, Justice White recalled the
earlier requirements that a waiver must be 'knowing and intelligent.' 2 "
In a Sixth Amendment context, he reasoned, a suspect should be aware
of his right to have counsel present during questioning as well as the
possible consequences of foregoing this right.242 He explained that the
police could meet this burden by demonstrating that Miranda warnings
were given and that the suspect made a knowing and intelligent
waiver.243 Justice White noted that the Miranda warnings served the
dual purpose of informing the petitioner of his right to have counsel
235. Id. at 291.
236. Id. at 290-91.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 291. This was a key distinction for Justice White. He noted that the petitioner had
to exercise his right to avoid questioning. Id. In this respect, the petitioner, an indictee, was no
different from an unindicted suspect with counsel available who does not request his attorney. Id.
As in Jackson and Edwards, the petitioner would have to request counsel to prevent questioning.
Id.
239. Id. In support of this notion, Justice White characterized Edwards as "[p]reserving the
integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with the police only through counsel.., not [as]
barring an accused from making an initial election as to whether he will face the State's officers
during questioning with the aid of counsel, or go it alone." Id.
240. Id. at 292.
241. Id. (citation omitted). Justice White referred to the knowing and intelligent standard as
set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938), or, as described in Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986), "full awareness [of] both the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of [abandonment]." Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292.
242. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292. In defining the appropriate standard for waiver, Justice White
stated that the proper inquiry must be: "[w]as the accused, who waived his Sixth Amendment
rights during postindictment questioning, made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel
present during the questioning, and of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of
counsel?" Id. at 292-93.
243. Id. Justice White was careful to limit the scope of the petitioner's waiver, however. He
was quick to point out that the waiver was made for the interrogation only. Id. at 293 n.5. In
addition, he pointed out that the waiver could have been revoked at any time had the petitioner
requested a lawyer. Id.
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present during questioning and of the consequences of his decision to
forego the right to counsel. 2 " Justice White found that those warnings
"satisfied the constitutional minimum" required to inform the suspect of
his rights.245
The Court then addressed and rejected the petitioner's contention
that the Sixth Amendment's "superiority" to the Fifth Amendment
demands additional protection.246 In fact, Justice White categorically
stated that neither amendment is" 'superior' or 'greater' than the other,"
thus negating the argument that a Sixth Amendment waiver, as com-
pared to a Fifth Amendment waiver, requires additional protection.247
The most significant parts of Justice White's position in Patterson
are his narrow reading of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel and
his view of an attorney's limited role in a post-indictment interroga-
tion. 248 At the trial stage, he agreed, counsel plays an extremely impor-
tant role-rendering effective legal representation. In a post-indictment
interrogation, however, "a lawyer's role is rather unidimensional:
largely limited to advising his client as to what questions to answer and
which ones to decline to answer. '249  Justice White reasoned that
because an attorney's role at a post-indictment interrogation is less
demanding than at trial, 250 a waiver of the right to counsel at this type of
an interrogation requires a less "searching or formal inquiry" than a
244. Id. at 293-94. To Justice White, the Miranda warnings conveyed the "sum and
substance" of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 293. The petitioner was told of his right to an
attorney, to have the attorney present during questioning and to exercise these rights even if he
could not afford his own attorney. Id. Justice White also noted that as a result of the Miranda
warnings, the petitioner knew that his statements could be used against him in court. Id. at 293-
94. Furthermore, the warnings served to inform the petitioner of an attorney's functions,
specifically, to advise the petitioner to remain silent. Id. at 294.
245. Id. at 294. The Court stated that the petitioner's ignorance or misunderstanding of the
consequences of a waiver is irrelevant to the state's methods of satisfying the "constitutional
minimum." Id.
246. Id. at 297-300.
247. Id. at 297. In rejecting this argument, Justice White refused to acknowledge the notion
that a Sixth Amendment waiver may have more dire consequences than a Fifth Amendment
waiver. As a result, Justice White rebuffed attempts to make the requirements for a Sixth
Amendment waiver more stringent than the requirements for a Fifth Amendment waiver. Id.
248. Id. at 296-300. Justice White acknowledged that an attorney plays a role of "enormous
importance" at trial. Id. at 298. As a result, the Court has imposed the "most rigorous restrictions
on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant, and the procedures that must be
observed, before permitting him to waive his right to counsel at trial." Id.
249. Id. at 294 n.6.
250. Id. at 298. Justice White noted that the Court weighed the "usefulness of counsel" against
the "dangers ... of proceeding without counsel" in assessing the requirements for waiver. Id.
Basically, a waiver is constitutional when the accused knows of both the role the attorney plays at
that particular stage and the consequences of proceeding alone. To support the use of Miranda
warnings in the Sixth Amendment context, Justice White stated that the Court did "not discern a
substantial difference between the usefulness of a lawyer to a suspect during custodial
interrogation, and his value to an accused at postindictment questioning." Id. at 299.
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waiver of the right to an attorney at trial.251 Therefore, he concluded
that a defendant may validly waive the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel in a post-indictment interrogation session so long as he has received
the Miranda warnings.252
The Patterson decision can be characterized as Justice White's tri-
umph over Massiah. In Patterson, Justice White succeeded in confining
the requirement of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the trial
stage of the criminal prosecution. While this limitation is reminiscent of
his dissent in Massiah, his triumph over the Sixth Amendment is incon-
sistent with his earlier transformation2 53 with regard to the Fifth Amend-
ment as Part IV of this Article demonstrates.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE JUSTIFIABLE, UNJUSTIFIABLE, AND
PARADOXICAL ASPECTS OF JUSTICE WHITE'S PARTIAL
METAMORPHOSIS
Justice White's transformation in the area of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence has breathed new life into the Miranda doctrine. None-
theless his change in position, although welcome, cannot be reconciled
with his continued opposition to Massiah and its progeny. With the
exception of his position in Michigan v. Jackson,2 54 Justice White's
refusal to embrace the Court's Sixth Amendment decisions is irreconcil-
able with his Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV of this Article
analyzes the contradictory nature of Justice White's positions under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments vis-a-vis police interrogation. Section A
focuses on Justice White's reaction to Escobedo and examines the valid-
ity of his view. Section B analyzes the overly narrow reading of the
Sixth Amendment protections first noted in his Massiah dissent and later
established as law in Patterson. Finally, Section C discusses the incon-
sistency of Justice White's continued scorn for the Sixth Amendment's
protections in light of his acceptance of Miranda and its progeny.
A. The Constitutional Illegitimacy and Eradication of Escobedo
The Court's holding in Escobedo v. Illinois,2"' was based on its
decision in Massiah to make the Sixth Amendment a source of constitu-
251. Id. Justice White rationalized that the dangers presented at the interrogation stage are
minor and easily recognized. Id. Therefore, a "simple and limited" set of Miranda warnings
serves to inform the defendant of the choices and consequences available to him. Id. at 299-300.
252. Id. at 299-300.
253. See supra notes 59-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice White's
transformation.
254. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
255. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See supra notes 165-180 and accompanying text for an analysis of
the facts and reasoning in Escobedo.
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tional protection for a suspect during a police interrogation prior to
indictment.256 Justice Goldberg, who wrote the majority opinion, stated
that the absence of an indictment "should make no difference" in deter-
mining the constitutionality of an interrogation.257 As a result, the Court
found that an interrogation that focused on the accused was as much a
critical stage as an indictment.258 Furthermore, the Court held that,
based on its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,259 an accused is entitled
to the presence of counsel during an interrogation. 2 °
In his dissent, Justice White challenged the constitutional basis of
the majority's decision.261 He characterized the majority's new rule as
"nebulous" and "wholly unworkable, 262 and labelled as "incongruous"
the Court's assumption that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel over-
shadowed the privilege against self-incrimination.263 In the long run his
views prevailed.
The Court adopted the spirit, if not the reasoning, of Justice
White's Escobedo dissent when it distinguished that decision to the
point of obscurity in later decisions. For example, in Johnson v. New
Jersey,2 4 the Court shifted the emphasis of Escobedo from the Sixth
Amendment to the Fifth Amendment.265 Later in that decision, the
Court noted that Escobedo was limited to its unique facts.266 In short,
Johnson greatly reduced the scope of Escobedo.
The Court reaffirmed the vitality of Johnson, and the demise of
256. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 484-85.
257. Id. at 485.
258. Id. at 486.
259. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court held that every person accused of a felony
crime is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of an attorney at trial.
260. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
261. Id. at 495-99 (White, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 496.
263. Id. at 497.
264. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). In Johnson, the Court had to decide whether Miranda and
Escobedo were to be applied retroactively. The petitioners were jointly tried for felony murder.
Prior to the interrogation, the petitioners were warned of their right to remain silent; however, the
petitioners did not receive the complete warnings mandated by Miranda. Id. at 720-25. During
the interrogation, the petitioners gave full confessions that were later used at their trial. Id. They
were convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 725. The Court held that Miranda
and Escobedo were not to be applied retroactively. Id. at 733.
265. Id. at 729. See also GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 172-74. In his work on Warren Court
decisions, Professor Graham explained that the Escobedo decision was a "constitutional trial
balloon" which the Court used to gauge the efficacy of further expansion of the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants. Id. at 172. Professor Graham also noted that the Escobedo and
Miranda decisions were quite distinct from previous constitutional testing and groundbreaking
engaged in by the Court because of the substantial changes imposed on unsuspecting state
jurisdictions. Id. at 172-74.
266. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 733-34.
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Escobedo, in Kirby v. Illinois.267 In Kirby, the Court held that an
accused does not have a constitutional right to have an attorney present
during pre-indictment identification procedures.268 In distinguishing
Kirby from United States v. Wade2 69 and Gilbert v. California,27 0 the
Court found that "[t]he initiation of judicial proceedings" was a crucial
factor in determining the legitimacy of identification procedures.27
Curiously, Justice White ignored this opportunity to discredit Escobedo
when he dissented from the majority's decision.27 2 Instead, he briefly
stated that Wade and Gilbert "govern this case and compel reversal of
the judgment below. "273
It was not until Moran v. Burbine2 74 that the Court, including Jus-
tice White, discarded Escobedo for all practical purposes. In Moran, the
Court affirmed its belief that Escobedo interpreted the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, not the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel .2 5  The Court found that "Escobedo provides no support for
[the] argument" that the right to counsel attaches prior to the initiation of
formal judicial proceedings. 6  In the aftermath of these decisions,
Escobedo has been relegated to a sterile and ineffectual existence.
Justice White's view has rightly prevailed. The Escobedo majority
incorrectly applied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pre-indict-
ment interrogation based on unsupported and misplaced reasoning. The
267. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion). In Kirby, the petitioner was stopped for
investigation by a police officer. In the course of showing the officer identification, the petitioner
and his companion displayed traveler's checks and other papers bearing the name of a recent
robbery victim. Id. at 684. The police then brought the victim to the station and escorted him into
the room where the petitioner and his companion were seated. Id. The victim positively
identified the two men as the men who robbed him. Id. No lawyer was present at the time of the
"show-up," although an attorney was appointed at the subsequent arraignment. This attorney tried
unsuccessfully to suppress any identification testimony from the "show-up." Id. at 685. The
victim testified at trial and again identified the petitioner and his confederate as the men who
robbed him. Id. at 685-86. The petitioner was convicted of robbery. Id. at 686. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 691.
268. Id. at 691.
269. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Wade established that the post-indictment lineup was a "critical
stage" of the prosecution, triggering the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
270. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Gilbert expanded on Wade and required an examination of the in-
court identification testimony to determine whether it was tainted by illegal lineup identification
procedures.
271. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90. The Court reasoned that the initiation of formal proceedings
"is far from a mere formalism." Id. at 689. Instead, it signifies the government's commitment to
prosecution. It is at this point that the protections of the Sixth Amendment are triggered. Id. at
690.
272. Id. at 705 (White, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See supra notes 75, 181-186 for an analysis of the facts and
reasoning in Moran.




Court first recognized the flaws in extending the Sixth Amendment, then
limited it through subsequent decisions, and finally cast Escobedo aside
in Moran. In his dissent in Escobedo, Justice White recognized the fal-
lacy of the Court's decision. As later decisions have demonstrated, Jus-
tice White correctly identified the error of applying the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to the facts in Escobedo. In this area, Jus-
tice White's view enjoys considerable support.27 7
B. Justice White's Unjustified Narrowing of the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel in his Opinions from Massiah to Patterson
In his Escobedo dissent, Justice White reprimanded the majority for
unnecessarily broadening the right to counsel. His opinions from the
Massiah dissent to the majority decision in Patterson, however, unjusti-
fiably diminished the proper role a defense attorney plays after the initi-
ation of formal adversarial proceedings. While undermining the
importance of defense counsel, Justice White has ignored two primary
purposes which counsel serves: ensuring that the criminally accused
receives a fair trial, and rendering effective assistance.278
In his dissent in Massiah, Justice White criticized the Court for
extending the right to counsel to encompass post-indictment interroga-
tions.2 79 He faulted the Court's rule proscribing post-indictment interro-
gation in the absence of counsel as being an unwarranted extension of
the Sixth Amendment. 280  According to Justice White, this new rule
277. See, e.g., FUNsrON, supra note 14, at 162-64. In his book, Professor Funston outlines the
difficulty in interpreting Escobedo clearly. He notes that the Court established a five part test that
included the following factors: 1) whether the investigation had "focused" on the accused; 2)
whether the accused was in custody; 3) whether the interrogation was designed to elicit
incriminating statements; 4) whether a request for counsel was made; and 5) whether warnings
were given. Id. at 163. Professor Funston also noted that "most criminal suspects lack[ed the]
sophistication" to appreciate these crucial nuances. Id. But see Dripps, supra note 14, at 631
(advancing the theory that the majority's Escobedo decision was a well-reasoned and supportable
opinion).
278. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) ("the right to the effective
assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial").
279. See generally Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207-13 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting).
280. Id. at 209. Justice White recognized that the majority's view would invite further
expansion of the Sixth Amendment. He stated:
[t]he importance of the matter should not be underestimated, for today's rule
promises to have wide application well beyond the facts of this case. The reason
given for the result here-the admissions were obtained in the absence of counsel-
would seem equally pertinent to statements obtained at any time after the right to
counsel attaches, whether there has been an indictment or not; to admissions made
prior to arraignment, at least where the defendant has counsel or asks for it; to the
fruits of admissions improperly obtained under the new rule; to criminal
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improperly enlarged the role of defense counsel and hindered the search
for the truth that is the focus of every trial.28'
His opposition to Massiah lay dormant until he authored the major-
ity opinion in Patterson. For example, in United States v. Henry,282 Jus-
tice White joined Justice Blackmun's dissent which sought to
distinguish the facts in that case from the facts in Massiah.2 83 The dis-
sent did not challenge Massiah or question its correctness.284 Instead,
the dissent characterized Massiah as the "outermost point" of the Sixth
Amendment.285 Furthermore, the dissent echoed Justice White's view
of Massiah when it criticized the Court for approving the suppression of
statements without considering their voluntary nature.286
Similarly, Justice White joined the dissent in Maine v. Moulton,287
which did not call Massiah into question, but instead focused on
expanding the "deliberate elicitation" requirement of Massiah.288 In his
dissent, Chief Justice Burger objected to the Court's decision to bar evi-
dence concerning an indicted offense which was gained during a post-
indictment investigation of separate uncharged crimes.219 The dissent
also expressed reservations about using the Sixth Amendment as a vehi-
cle to bar relevant and reliable evidence.
290
It was not until Patterson v. Illinois291 that Justice White returned
to his steadfast opposition to Massiah. In Patterson, Justice White gut-
ted Massiah and severely diminished the role of defense counsel. The
Patterson decision, in the context of interrogation, confined the defense
attorney's post-indictment role to "advising his client as to what ques-
proceedings in state courts; and to defendants long since convicted upon evidence
including such admissions.
Id. at 208-09.
281. Id. at 208, 209.
282. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). See supra notes 202-212 and accompanying text for an analysis of
the facts and reasoning in Henry. Justice White's dissent in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
429 (1977) (White, J., dissenting), also signaled an acquiescence to Massiah. In Brewer, Justice
White focused on the issue of waiver, rather than the validity of Massiah.
283. See generally Henry, 447 U.S. at 277-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
284. Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Compare id. at 289-302
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning the underlying rationale and continuing validity of
Massiah).
285. Id. at 282 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 281.
287. 474 U.S. 189 (1985). See supra notes 213-225 and accompanying text for an analysis of
the facts and reasoning in Moulton.
288. See generally Moulton, 474 U.S. at 181-92 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
289. Id. at 184-90.
290. Id. at 191.
291. 487 U.S. 285 (1988). See supra notes 234-252 and accompanying text for an analysis of
the facts and reasoning in Patterson.
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tions to answer and which ones to decline to answer. 2 9 2
This constricted view is unjustified and cannot be reconciled with
the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel in post-indictment settings. Justice White's narrow definition
of counsel's role failed to account for the role an attorney plays in pre-
paring for trial after indictment and rendering effective assistance.
Beyond these goals, an attorney can do more than simply advise his or
her client which questions to answer and which questions to refuse to
answer. In the pre-trial stage, for example, counsel is in a position to
assess the strength of the prosecution's case and the client's defense,
advise the client of how a confession adds evidence to the prosecutor's
case, ascertain the impact of a confession on trial strategy, analyze the
consequences of a confession at a later sentencing hearing, and finally,
estimate the influence of a confession on an affirmative defense and par-
ticularly on a possible insanity defense. In contrast to Justice White's
belief, the Supreme Court has implicitly and explicitly recognized these
aspects of the attorney's function in several cases.
The Court, in Powell v. Alabama,293 recognized the vital need for
an attorney at every step of the proceedings to insure that the accused
receives a fair trial. In Powell, the Court observed that the effectiveness
of the trial attorney depends on the attorney's pre-trial preparation and
investigation of the underlying facts of a charge.294  The paramount
objective of the Court was providing a fair trial and realizing that goal
by providing counsel to the accused to offset the forces of the prosecu-
tion arrayed against him.2 95 Therefore, Powell established the vital role
292. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 294 n.6.
293. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also FuNsrON, supra note 14, at 143 (describing the trial court
proceedings as "one of the major perversions of procedural fairness in America's legal history").
294. Id. at 58.
295. Id. at 69. The Court reasoned as follows:
[elven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. Similar sentiments were expressed in opinions joined by Justice White. For example, in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment, as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that indigent defendants be afforded
counsel when brought to trial for a felony crime. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that
"any person haled into court ... cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
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an attorney plays in a criminal trial.296 That role was advanced to an
earlier point in time before trial and clarified in later decisions.
In Fare v. Michael C.,297 for example, a majority of the Court,
including Justice White, analyzed the proper role of an attorney at the
pre-trial stage. Although decided on Fifth Amendment grounds, Fare
provides crucial insight into the Court's assessment of the defense attor-
ney's role. The Court noted that in an interrogation setting, counsel acts
as "the protector of the legal rights of [the defendant] in his dealings
with the police and the courts. 298 In addition, the Court recognized the
important role an attorney plays in ascertaining the extent of his client's
involvement in the crime under investigation. 299
Justice White also joined a decision by the Court in Strickland v.
Washington,3 °° which recognized the importance of pre-trial investiga-
Id. at 344. In addition, the Court later observed that the use an attorneys in criminal courts are
"necessities, not luxuries." In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court clarified
Gideon when it held that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was repre-
sented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated that "[t]he
assistance of counsel is often a.requisite to the very existence of a fair trial." Id. at 31. Further-
more, the Court relied on Gideon and Powell for the proposition that the right to an attorney is a
"fundamental" right of the accused. Id. at 32. Finally, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979),
the Court limited Argersinger's extension of Gideon to a case where the accused was actually
incarcerated. The Court explained that the severity of a prison or jail term of any duration man-
dates that the accused be afforded the assistance of counsel, despite the financial cost to society of
providing attorneys to indigent defendants. Id. at 372-73.
296. Of utmost importance is the sentiment expressed in the following sentences of the Court's
opinion: "[h]owever guilty defendants, upon due inquiry, might prove to have been, they were,
until convicted, presumed to be innocent. It was the duty of the court having their cases in charge
to see that they were denied no necessary incident of a fair trial." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
44, 52 (1932).
297. 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Fare was brought to the Court on a claim that the respondent, a
juvenile, was denied the protections of Miranda. The police took the respondent into custody to
question him about a murder. The respondent was informed of his right to an attorney, and
requested a consultation with his probation officer. Id. at 710. This request was denied, and the
respondent subsequently gave the police a statement implicating himself in the murder. These
statements provided the bulk of the state's evidence against the respondent at his trial. Id. at 711.
The Court held that the respondent's request for his probation officer was not, in this case, a
request for an attorney, and therefore, did not trigger Miranda's protections. Id. at 727-28.
298. Id. at 719. The Court noted that the Miranda protections were aimed at safeguarding the
"critical position" an attorney plays in protecting the Fifth Amendment rights of his client during
police interrogation. Id. As a result, the right to have an attorney present at an interrogation "is
indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. In addition, the presence
of counsel at the interrogation protects the accused from police misconduct. In contrast, the
probation officer lacks the necessary tools to be an effective advocate before "both police and
courts." Id.
299. Id. at 721. The Court also noted that the attorney-client privilege exists to protect these
trial preparations. Id. at 721-22.
300. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Court examined the merits of the respondent's
claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. The
respondent voluntarily confessed to a murder and related crimes after his accomplices were
arrested. He was indicted and an attorney was appointed for him. Against his attorney's advice,
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tion by defense counsel. In Strickland, the Court reiterated that "the
right to counsel exists.., in order to protect the fundamental right to a
fair trial."30 ' The Court noted that counsel must make "reasonable
investigations" into the validity of the accused's defense or the prosecu-
tor's case.30 2 In Strickland, the court also touched upon the effect of a
confession on trial strategy. The accused's decision in Strickland to
forego his attorney's advice and give complete confessions to the police
severely impacted on the attorney's sentencing strategy.3 °3 The defense
attorney, faced with the overwhelming effect of the confessions, focused
his advocacy on the petitioner's acceptance of responsibility for the
crimes." In deciding the case, the Court recognized that the attorney's
efforts were reasonable in light of the evidence presented by the state,
including the confessions. 30 5 The Court also noted that the admissibility
of the confessions was a crucial aspect of the defense attorney's strategy
at sentencing.3 °6 The overpowering effect of the confessions, coupled
with the attorney's knowledge of the trial judge's preference for the
accused to accept responsibility for his criminality, prompted the
defense counsel to highlight his client's remorse. 30 7  Again, the Court
found this decision to be reasonable in light of the accumulated evi-
dence. 30 8 Thus, in Strickland, the Court acknowledged the importance
of an attorney's pre-trial investigation and the effect confessions have on
trial and sentencing strategy.
The Court also analyzed the influence of incriminating statements
the respondent confessed to two more murders and waived his right to a jury trial. At a "plea
colloquy" the respondent informed the trial judge that he had committed the crimes while laboring
under "extreme stress." Id. at 672. The respondent again rebuffed his attorney's advice and
waived his right to an advisory jury at the sentencing phase of his trial. Id. At the sentencing
hearing, the attorney elected to forego presenting evidence about the respondent's character and
mental state. This decision was made after weighing the evidentiary impact of the respondent's
confessions. Id. at 673. At the sentencing hearing, the attorney argued that the respondent
committed the crimes while under "extreme mental or emotional disturbance," in an attempt to
show mitigating circumstances. Id. at 674. The trial judge found several aggravating
circumstances and sentenced the respondent to death. Id. at 675. The respondent received habeas
corpus relief after successfully arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Id. at
682-83. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the respondent did receive
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 701.
301. Id. at 684.
302. Id. at 691.
303. Id. at 672-73. The Court noted that the attorney's decision to omit character evidence
"reflected [his] sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent's
confessions to the gruesome crimes." Id. at 673.
304. Id.
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on the sentencing stage in Estelle v. Smith.3° In Estelle, the Court,
including Justice White, found that the state had violated the accused's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the sentencing hearing when it
used statements made by the accused during a psychiatric interview. °
The Court reasoned that the psychiatric interview was a "critical stage"
of the litigation, and therefore, the accused had a right to the assistance
of an attorney at that time.31  As a result, the Court held that the
expert's testimony at the sentencing phase violated the right to
counsel.312
In Wainwright v. Greenfield,1 3 the Court, in an opinion supported
by Justice White, addressed the effects that a suspect's behavior during
interrogation has on the insanity defense. In Greenfield, the prosecution
discredited the accused's insanity defense by pointing to the accused's
post-Miranda silence.31 4  Although Greenfield does not address the
effect of a confession on the insanity defense, it is instructive in analyz-
ing the emphasis the Court placed on the "fundamental unfairness" of
using constitutionally allowed silence to establish sanity (or guilt).3 5 It
follows logically from Greenfield that a confession, which is the ulti-
mate waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, could be used
constitutionally to rebut an insanity defense and prove the accused's
guilt.
Finally, in Nix v. Whiteside,31 6 the Court once again addressed the
309. 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Estelle, the respondent was indicted for murder. After being
informed that the prosecution was seeking the death penalty, the trial court ordered a psychiatric
examination of the respondent. Id. at 456-57. The psychiatrist informed the trial judge that the
respondent was competent to stand trial. After a jury trial, the respondent was convicted of
murder. Id. at 457. At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution called the psychiatrist to
testify on the "future dangerousness" of the respondent, a factor in imposing the death penalty. Id.
at 458-60. The respondent received the death penalty. Id. at 460. After unsuccessful appeals to
the state court system, the respondent received habeas corpus relief from the federal courts. Id. at
460-61. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, id. at 468-69, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 471.
310. Id. at 471.
311. Id. at 470.
312. Id. at 471.
313. 474 U.S. 284 (1986). In Greenfield, the respondent was arrested for battery and informed
of his Miranda rights. At this point, the respondent requested an attorney. Id. at 286. At trial, the
prosecutor used the respondent's request for an attorney to rebut the insanity defense, and the
respondent was convicted. Id. at 287. After exhausting direct review, the respondent was granted
habeas corpus relief. Id. at 289. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the prosecutor's
actions violated the respondent's exercise of Miranda rights as described in Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976). Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295.
314. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 287.
315. Id. at 291 n.6. The Court noted that the Miranda warnings provide "implicit assurances"
that there will be no reprisals for the exercise of the right to remain silent. Id.
316. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). The Supreme Court held that the right to effective assistance of
counsel does not include the right to present perjured testimony. Id. at 176.
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value of pre-trial preparation by counsel. In the opinion, joined by Jus-
tice White, the Court stressed that the right to counsel is designed to
advance a fair trial, and that the attorney's role is coordinated to "legiti-
mate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as a
search for truth." '317 To that end, an attorney "must take all reasonable
lawful means to attain the objectives of the client. 318 In recognizing
that counsel must serve the needs of the accused in an ethical manner,
the Court did not narrow the scope of the role of the attorney in pre-trial
or trial representation.
In light of the general acceptance by the Court and Justice White of
the broad interpretation of the right to counsel in judicial proceedings,
Justice White's narrow interpretation of the right to counsel in post-
indictment interrogations is unfounded. He has ignored the crucial part
an attorney plays before trial in safeguarding the accused's right to a fair
trial and overlooked how the interrogation process endangers the consti-
tutional requirement that the accused be afforded effective trial assist-
ance. Justice White's position on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is highly unsettling, and his views are inconsistent with his metamorpho-
sis in regard to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
C. The Paradox of Justice White's Positions on the Fifth
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
Justice White's opposition to the application of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel in post-indictment interrogations cannot be recon-
ciled with his position on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. When he penned his dissent in Miranda, it was consistent
with his position in Massiah that neither the Fifth Amendment nor the
Sixth Amendment protects the accused from police interrogation. His
eventual embrace of Miranda would therefore suggest an acceptance of
Massiah as well. Nonetheless, his steadfast refusal to use the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as a vehicle for protecting the accused at
post-indictment interrogation remained unchanged. A juxtaposition of
Fifth Amendment analysis on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence makes
this position all the more puzzling.
An examination of Justice White's positions after his partial meta-
morphosis demonstrates that his Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is ulti-
mately concerned with safeguarding the accused's right to a fair trial.
317. Id. at 166.
318. Id.
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
That is also the goal of the Sixth Amendment. In Edwards v. Arizona,
319
Justice White first dropped his opposition to Miranda and the Fifth
Amendment for safeguarding the accused's constitutional rights during
custodial interrogation. Edwards also signaled Justice White's accept-
ance of the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard for determining
the validity of a confession.320 In the Edwards decision, the 'accused's
unfulfilled request for counsel during interrogation was a critical fact to
the Court's holding.3 2' Justice White reasoned that it was "inconsistent
with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to
reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to
counsel. 322 The basis for that inconsistency was the denial of the
accused's right to counsel, which is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,
during interrogation.323 The Edwards decision indicates the level of
importance Justice White accords to the right of counsel at an
interrogation.
The Edwards decision formed the basis for the Court's Sixth
Amendment decision in Michigan v. Jackson.a24 Jackson provides a
rare instance of Justice White's toleration of the authority of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in interrogation proceedings. To be consis-
tent with his reasoning in Edwards, Justice White had no choice but to
acquiesce to the Court's analysis in Jackson.325 Five years after Jack-
son, Justice White's opinion in Arizona v. Fulminante326 signified his
further acceptance of the concerns that underlie the Miranda decision.
In Fulminante, Justice White abandoned his "search for truth" argument
against Miranda,327 as well as his earlier view that the privilege against
self-incrimination only shields the accused from judicially compelled
admissions.328 He observed that a "coerced confession is fundamentally
different from other types of erroneously admitted evidence, ' 329 because
319. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
facts and reasoning in Edwards.
320. Id. at 482.
321. See id. at 482.
322. Id. at 485.
323. Id. at 485-86.
324. 475 U.S. 625 (1986). See supra notes 226-233 and accompanying text for an analysis of
the facts and reasoning in Jackson.
325. In Jackson, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Edwards decision. See generally
Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629-36. It was not until the Court's decision in Patterson that Justice White
was able to return to his original opposition to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See supra
notes 234-252 and accompanying text.
326. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text for an analysis
of the facts and reasoning in Fulminante.
327. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1257 (White, J., dissenting in part).
328. Id. at 1253-57.
329. Id. at 1254.
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of the overpowering effect it has on the fact-finding process. 330 A
coerced confession " 'abort[s] the basic trial process' and 'render[s] a
trial fundamentally unfair.' "331
Justice White's position in Withrow v. Williams 332 offers further
proof of his approval of Miranda and its concerns. In Withrow, Justice
White aligned himself with the defenders of Miranda. There, the Court
focused on the ingredients of a fundamentally fair trial, comparing the
policy of Miranda to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and non-discriminatory jury selection.333 The Court noted that
these types of constitutional violations would affect the fairness of the
trial.3 34 Similarly, the Court likened Miranda's protection to the con-
cerns of the Sixth Amendment regarding effective assistance of counsel
and a fair trial. 335 As the Court correctly concluded, the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel is the means of assuring the accused a fair
trial.336 Ultimately the Sixth Amendment "confers a 'fundamental right'
on criminal defendants, one that 'assures the fairness, and thus the legiti-
macy, of our adversary process.' "-33 By joining this opinion, Justice
White once again showed his concern for the interests of a fair trial and
the effective assistance of counsel. With that in mind, his continued
hostility to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not justified.
V. CONCLUSION
The concerns of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are similar
to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Both seek
to prevent the introduction of unreliable confessions and promote the
accused's right to a fair trial. The congruence of the two amendments,
therefore, compels analogous attitudes in the area of police interroga-
tion. Justice White's continued enmity towards the right to counsel in
this area is unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable, in light of his firm
acceptance of Miranda and the privilege against self-incrimination as a
means of protecting the accused's constitutional rights during police
interrogation and at the subsequent trial. When the Miranda decision
was handed down, Justice White was its harshest critic. Since 1981 he
330. Id. at 1255.
331. Id. at 1257 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 578 n.6 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
332. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993). See supra notes 131-141 and accompanying text for an analysis
of the facts and reasoning in Withrow.
333. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1751.
337. Id. at 1751 (quoting Kimmelmann v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986)).
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has embraced and even expanded the protections set forth in that opin-
ion. This change is commendable and most welcome, but it cannot be
reconciled with his continued opposition to the application of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in post-indictment custodial interrogation.
As a result, Justice White retired from the Court with his metamorphosis
in the area of police interrogation incomplete.
